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MORAL NUISANCES
John CopelandNagle*
The law tells us that a private nuisance is a substantial interference with the
use and enjoyment of one's land. What it fails to explain is what kinds of
interferences, and what uses and enjoyment, are protected by nuisance law.
The twentieth century cases that are familiar to most of us today suggest that
polluting smokestacks, corroded tanks leaking hazardous wastes into the
groundwater, barking dogs, noisy trains, and smelly hog farms represent the
kinds of activities that can be targeted by neighboring landowners as a

nuisance. 1 The cases most frequently excerpted in the property and torts
casebooks that address nuisance law follow a similar pattern. 2 In other words,
there are environmental nuisances and sensory nuisances.
That was general wisdom when Teri Powers and Glen Mark, a married
couple, purchased a house along the Columbia River about fifteen miles
outside of Portland, Oregon in 1990.3 The property chosen by the married
couple was bordered on all sides by the Sauvie Island Wildlife Area, a state

' Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1986); B.A.,
Indiana University (1982). Nicole Garnett, Rick Gamett, and Marc Poirier provided invaluable comments on
an earlier draft of this Article. I am also grateful for the assistance of research librarian Patty Ogden, and for
the efforts of research assistants Lisa Hudson, Babu Kaza, Michael Occhuizzio, and Chris Schultz. lam also
thankful to my colleague A.J. Bellia for inspiring me to write this Article.
1 See, e.g., Rushing v. Kansas City So. Ry., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that federal law did
not preempt a nuisance claim against the noises and vibrations caused by a nearby railroad); Parks Hiway
Enters., LLC. v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995 P.2d 657 (Alaska 2000) (holding that a gasoline supplier was not
responsible for a nuisance involving a gas station's leaking storage tanks); Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (finding that a cattle feedlot constituted a nuisance but ordering the
residential neighbors to pay the costs necessary to move the feedlot elsewhere); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding permanent damages to residents living near a cement plant); Zang
v. Engle, No. OOAP-290, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4222 (Sept. 19, 2000) (holding that a neighbor's barking
dogs constituted a nuisance).
2 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.KRIER, PROPERTY 741-48 (4th ed. 1998) (reprinting Boomer
and Spur Industries,supra note 1, and cases involving a noisy air conditioner and a polluting oil refinery);
JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND PoLIcY: A COMPARATIVE INsTrrUTIONAL
PERSPECTrIVE 298-305, 311-15 (1998) (reprinting Boomer and a case involving fumes from a coal operation);
VICTOR E. SCIIWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND ScHWARTZ's TORTS (10th ed. 2000) (reprinting Boomer,

Spur Industries, and cases involving a factory contaminating the groundwater, an oil refinery polluting the air,
and a grocery store located in a residential neighborhood).
3 Details about Mark and Powers' dispute can be found in Mark v. Oregon State Dep't of Fish and
Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716, 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
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refuge that attracted numerous species of wildlife. It also attracted thousands
of nude sunbathers who enjoyed the beach immediately adjacent to the
property owned by Powers and Mark. The couple was displeased. They were
embarrassed to entertain friends or family in the presence of those using the
adjacent nude beach. They were repulsed by the sight of public sexual activity.
They were harassed by nudists who chided them for remaining clothed. They
worried that the value of their property had declined. So Power and Mark
complained to the state wildlife agency that was responsible for the property
used by the public as a nude beach. Unsatisfied by the agency's response, the
couple sued. They claimed that the activities associated with the nude beach
constituted a nuisance. 4
The deployment of nuisance law to combat immoral activities evokes
images of nineteenth century cases involving brothels, saloons, gambling
parlors, and other unsavory venues. The leading nineteenth century treatise on
nuisances is filled with descriptions of such cases.5 To be sure, the standard
definition of a nuisance still refers to moral harms. But commentators have
assumed that immoral conduct can no longer serve as the basis for a nuisance
claim.6 The prostitutes, saloon keepers, and other bad actors who starred in the
moral nuisance cases seem like they belong to a bygone era.
The plight of Teri Powers and Glen Mark demonstrates that reports of the
death of moral nuisances are greatly exaggerated, however. The district court
dismissed their case against the presence of the neighboring nude beach for
failure to state a claim, but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed.7 As the
appellate court explained, "[u]ndesired exposure to sexual activity.., is one of'
the traditional grounds for finding either a public or a private nuisance. S

4 Seeidat718.
5 See 1 HORACE G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NuIsANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS
FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUrrY 49-85 (3d ed. 1893) (describing cases
involving houses of ill-fame, disorderly houses, houses of assignation, billiard rooms, gaming houses, theaters
used for low and vicious plays, common scolds, eavesdroppers, indecent exposure, and selling obscene
pictures and books).
6 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 741-78 (describing the law of nuisance without
mentioning moral nuisances); Louise A. Halper, Untanglingthe Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REv.
89 (1998) (describing the history and current use of nuisance law without noting the existence of moral
nuisances).
7 Mark, 974 P.2d at 716.
8 Id. at 719.
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sexual activity, could also constitute a nuisance in
Nudity itself, even absent
9
certain circumstances.

Mark v. Oregon State Department of Fish and Wildlife is one of a number

of recent moral nuisance cases. Crack houses have been targeted as nuisances
because of their impact on the moral fiber of urban communities.' 0 A St. Louis
hotel has been targeted as a nuisance because of its relationship to prostitution
in the neighborhood. 11 The Arkansas Supreme Court has enjoined a church
bingo game as a nuisance. 12 Adult entertainment facilities have been
challenged in a variety of cases.13 Many of these cases involve governmental
actions to abate public nuisances, but the reasoning would support nuisance
actions brought by neighbors affected by such immoral conduct as well. The
nineteenth century cases could reappear just as we enter the twenty-first
century.
But a few things changed during the intervening twentieth century. States
enacted statutes regulating public nuisances, such as the display of obscene4
movies, rather than leaving such questions to the common law.'
Constitutional law now presents substantial obstacles to the enforcement of
nuisance statutes and common law nuisance claims alike.' 5 Societal attitudes
toward morality have also changed significantly over the course of the
twentieth century. The law often reflected such changes. In 1915, an unmarried man and woman who were living together qualified as a public
9 See id. at 720. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, but the appeals court
did not actually find that the use of the wildlife area for a nude beach constituted a private or public nuisance.
Rather, the court noted that the determination of whether a nuisance existed depended upon an factual analysis
of a number of factors to be conducted by the district court in the first instance. See id. at 720. The court also
considered whether the state was liable for a nuisance because of its failure to control the activities of the
private individuals who used the wildlife area as a nude beach. The majority concluded that an Oregon statute
permitted the state to be held liable for damages but not injunctive relief, see id. at 722-24, while a dissenting
judge would have held that the state could have been liable for both remedies. See id. at 725-27 (Edmonds, J.,
dissenting).
10 See Omar Saleem, Killing the ProverbialTwo Birds with One Stone: Using Environmental Statutes
and Nuisance to Combat the Crime of Illegal Drug Trafficking, 100 DicK. L. REv. 685, 708-28 (1996)
(analyzing the use of nuisance actions to halt illegal drug activities).
1I See City of St. Louis v. Varahi, Inc., No. ED77802, 2001 WL 204796 (Mo. App. Feb. 28, 2001)
(opinion not released for publication pending possible rehearing, transfer, or modification).
12 See Masterson v. State ex rel. Bryant, 949 S.W.2d 63 (Ark. 1997).
13 See City of Chicago v. Geraci, 332 N.E.2d 487 (1l. App. 1975) (enjoining a massage parlor as a
common law public nuisance); Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Att'y v. Dizzy Duck, 535 N.W.2d
178 (Mich. 1995) (remanding for determination of whether a club in which lap dancing and assignation for
prostitution occurred should be padlocked).
14 See infra text accompanying note 57.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 230-41.
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Today, a cause of action that enables a landowner to seek relief from the
unwanted effects of a neighbor's purportedly immoral activities rests on
several controversial premises. It presumes that the conduct of one's neighbor
can be judged immoral, that such conduct causes real harms, and that those
harms can be remedied by the law. It presumes that what one does on one's
own land can be limited by the moral sensibilities of one's neighbor. It
presumes that the courts are properly positioned to render such judgments
rather than relying on zoning laws and other land use regulations.
This Article examines the questions raised by the phenomenon of moral
nuisances as we enter the twenty-first century. Part I provides a general
overview of nuisance law. Part II explains that many, though not all, of the
injuries suffered by a landowner subjected to a neighbor's immoral activity fit
comfortably within the kinds of injuries that the law routinely acknowledges as
supporting nuisance claims. Nuisance law also provides a mechanism for
ensuring that any moral objections are commonly held in the community, and
not just the idiosyncratic beliefs of a particular individual. Part III considers
the defendant's perspective. It concludes that the combination of the
traditional test for determining what constitutes a nuisance and the applicable
constitutional and statutory protections provide sufficient assurances that
individuals will not be subjected to the whims of individual landowners or
overzealous communities. Part I1 also explains that nuisance actions brought
by private individuals can be the appropriate legal response to injuries that
governmental officials are unwilling or unable to address. Moral nuisance
claims, in other words, can perform the same function as citizen suits used to
respond to air and water pollution under federal environmental laws.
My theory of moral nuisances evolves from the discussion in Parts II and
III. A moral nuisance exists where (1) a substantial and legally cognizable
interference with a landowner's use or enjoyment of his or her land is caused
by (2) an action that is regarded as immoral by a reasonable person within the
community (3) whose harm outweighs the benefit of the offending conduct,
16 See Adams v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W. 1006 (Ky. 1915).
17 See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employmeait & Housing Conm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) (holding that a
widow who believed that sex outside of marriage is sinful violated the state housing law by refusing to rent to
an unmarried couple). The application of fair housing laws to landlords who have a moral or religious
objection to the presence of a particular tenant remains controversial. See generally Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On
Law and Chastity,76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 669 nn. 192-93 (2001) (citing cases).
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and (4) which is not protected by the law. A moral nuisance claim is even
stronger when (5) the activity is not only immoral, but illegal as well. The first
criterion focuses on the kinds of injuries suffered by someone else's immoral
activities. The second criterion emphasizes that the judgment about the
morality of the activity must be grounded in the community's norms. Here the
question is not just whether the community regards the defendant's activity as
immoral, but whether the community finds the activity to be suficiently
objectionable that it need not be tolerated. It also affords an opportunity to
consider the purported benefits of the allegedly objectionable activity. The
third criterion incorporates the balancing test that was originally designed to
determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate in nuisance cases, but which
is now often employed to judge whether a nuisance exists at all. The fourth
criterion recognizes that many activities that the law once regulated as a matter
of course are now protected by the First Amendment, substantive due process,
and other constitutional doctrines. The criterion also recognizes, though, that
other activities that are commonly regarded as immoral remain beyond the
protections of the Constitution. The fifth criterion gives private individuals a
direct means of seeking legal protection from conduct that is prohibited by law.
I describe how these factors would apply to the nude beach and public
sexual activity challenged in Mark throughout Parts II and III. Mark and
Powers suffered harms of the kind that have long been recognized by nuisance
law. Thus the trial court held on remand that "a private nuisance exists as to
regular intrusive nudity which is visible from plaintiff's property," and "as to
the numerous episodes of illegal sexual conduct occurring on defendant's
property which is observable from plaintiff's property." 18 But my test for
moral nuisances extends beyond claims involving public nudity. In Part IV, I
consider several purportedly immoral activities that can be challenged via
nuisance claims. I explain that a variety of conduct endemic to low income
neighborhoods and certain animal rights claims can support moral nuisance
cases, but objections to a house of worship because of its teachings cannot.
IS Letter from Ted E. Grove, Circuit Court Judge, to Teri L. Powers, Robert A. Peterson, and Angela M.
Stewart 2 (Mar. 30, 2001) (on file with author) ("Letter from Judge Grove"). The trial court announced its
decision in an unpublished letter issued just before this Article was published, so that decision is discussed
only briefly here. For media reports and responses to the trial held on remand, see Robert Blacksmith, Nudists
Shun Rude Behavior, THE OEGONIAN, Mar. 17, 2001, at B8 (letter to the editor denying that harassment or
sexual activity occurs at the nude beach); Jonathan Nelson, Island's Nude Sunbathers Pose Nuisance and
Threat, Homeowner Tells Judge,THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 8, 2001, at C1; Jonathan Nelson, Judge Rules Some
Nude Sunbathers Createa Nuisance, THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al; Jonathan Nelson, Sauvie Island
Homeowners Want State Cover-Up at Nude Beach, THE OREGOIAN, Mar. 7, 2001; Christopher Webster,

Lawsuit Over Bare Essentials,THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 13, 2001, at B6.
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NUISANCE LAW AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Nuisance law is generally ignored by academics. Nearly thirty years ago,
Robert Ellickson complained that nuisance law is "suffering from neglect," it
and
received "little attention in modem casebooks on torts and property,"
,,19
The
"[s]cholarly analysis of nuisance problems has been minimal."
intervening decades have not witnessed a revival in academic attention to
nuisance law, save for a number of rather focused articles occasioned by the
Supreme Court's holding that a fifth amendment taking cannot exist if the
regulated conduct constituted a nuisance anyway. 20
Nuisance law also has a reputation for being hopelessly confusing. As
William Prosser put it, "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the
entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' 2 1 The general
understanding that private nuisance law involves harms related to land-a
qualification that Prosser insisted was necessary to maintain any coherence at
all for nuisance law2 -is belied by continuing efforts to characterize conduct
23
not involving land as a nuisance. The account of nuisance law contained in
19 Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines As Land Use
Controls,40 U. CHi.L REv. 681, 719-20; accordW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW

OF TORTS 617 (5th ed. 1984) ("PRoSSER & KEETON") (commenting that "there has been a rather astonishing
lack of any full consideration of 'nuisance' on the part of legal writers"); Halper, supra note 6, at 91 (noting
that nuisance law has been "little studied").
20 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (indicating that a governmental
regulation that effectively takes someone's property triggers the Fifth Amendment's compensation
requirement, unless the regulation targets a harm that would be regarded as a nuisance under state common
law); see generally Halper, supranote 6, at 91 (suggesting that takings law has "restored" nuisance law "to the
agenda of regulators, legislators, and planners").
21 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 616; accordLucas, 505 U.S. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(opining that "one searches in vain... for anything resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance");
Ellickson, supra note 19, at 720 (concluding that "the confusions and efficiencies in the law of nuisance are
considerably more serious than in most other areas of the law"); Halper, supra note 5, at 90 (acknowledging
that "[n]uisance doctrine is notoriously contingent and unsummarizable," and quoting additional complaints
about the confusion surrounding nuisance law); 1 WOOD, supranote 5, at iii (insisting in 1875 that "it must be
remembered that I was a pioneer in this 'wilderness' of the law, with no compass to guide me, but left to find
my way through the entangled mass as best I might"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 356 (1999)
(insisting that the "core meanings" of nuisance "have proved quite durable over time").
22 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 618-19 (contending that "[i]f 'nuisance' is to have any
meaning at all, it is necessary to dismiss a considerable number of cases which have applied the term to
matters not connected either with land or with any public right, as mere aberration");see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS at 84 (asserting that private nuisance "is always a tort against land, and the plaintiff's action
must always be founded upon his interest in the land").
23 See, e.g., Mahogany Run Condominium Ass'n v. ICG Realty Mgmt. Corp., 40 V.I. 404,406-7 (1999)
(rejecting the claim that the failure to endorse a check constituted a private nuisance).
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the Restatement of Torts-a source of innumerable citations for basic nuisance
principles-itself was plagued by "great controversy and division" that
included a threshold debate about whether to treat nuisance law in the
Restatement of Torts or the Restatement of Property.24 And the nuisance law
described in Prosser's leading tort law treatise often conflicts with both the
Restatement and the views of Prosser himself2 5
This combination of neglect and confusion prompt me to briefly sketch the
contours of nuisance law before turning to moral nuisances in particular.
Nuisance law is divided into private nuisances and public nuisances. Private
nuisances exist when there has been a substantial interference with the use or
enjoyment of someone's land.26 If the defendant's invasion of the plaintiff's
interest in her land is intentional-i.e., if the defendant either knows that the
activity is likely to interfere with a neighbor's use and enjoyment of her land,
or if the defendant actually intends such an interference-then the activity
constitutes a nuisance if the invasion is unreasonable.27 In the less frequent
circumstance that the invasion is unintentional, then the activity can still be a
nuisance if it is negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous. 28 In most
instances, the determination of whether an activity constitutes a nuisance
depends upon the circumstances of the case, but there are a small number of
activities which 29are nuisances in any setting, and thus are described as
nuisances per se.
There are several ways of judging whether the defendant's invasion of the
plaintiff's interest in land is unreasonable. Perhaps the most common
approach balances the gravity of the plaintiffs harm with the utility of the

24 Halper, supra note 6, at 119.
25 See id. at 127-28 (explaining the history of the conflict between Prosser, the Restatement, and later
editors of Prosser's treatise).
26 See DWYER & MENELL, supra note 2, at 296 (defining a private nuisance as "an activity that
substantially interferes with another's use and enjoyment of his land"); see also RESTATEMNT (SECO,,D)
TORTS § 821D (defining a private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land"). Louise Halper argues that nuisance law involves "not injury to rights in
property, but injuryfrom some use of property." Halper, supra note 6, at 97. That distinction is not especially
relevant to the thesis that I advance here.
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 822(a) (stating the rule for intentional invasions); id. § 825
(defining "intentional" invasions).
21 See id. § 822(b).

29 See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that
activities that imminently and dangerously threaten the public health are nuisances per se because they are
offensive at all times and at all places); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 636-37 (discussing such
"absolute" nuisances).

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

defendant's conduct. The gravity of the harm is measured by its extent, its
character, its suitability for the location, the social value of the plaintiff's31
affected use or enjoyment, and the ability of the plaintiff to avoid the harm.
The utility of the conduct is measured by its social value, its suitability for the
location, and the ability of the defendant to prevent the harm. 32 Another
approach to determining whether the invasion is unreasonable asks if the
plaintiffs harm is serious and if the defendant could pay compensation and
still afford to engage in the activity.33 Finally, and of particular significance
with respect to moral nuisances, an invasion is unreasonable if it causes
and the defendant's conduct is "contrary to common standards
significant harm
34
of decency."
The prohibited interference with the use or enjoyment of the land can
involve environmental contamination; unwanted sounds, lights, sights, and
odors; or immoral activities.35 The list of activities found to be actionable
nuisances includes a salt-mining operation that contaminated the groundwater, 36 a factory emitting pollution into the air,37 a house that interferes with
sun shining on a neighbor's property, 38 a theater hosting a Chinese music
performance in a residential neighborhood,39 the lights of a minor league
41
Obviously, though, not all
baseball field, 40 and houses of prostitution.
unwanted pollution, sound, light, or other activities qualify as a nuisance.
"The law does not concern itself with trifles," as the Restatement of Torts puts
it, so "there must be a real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiffs interests
before he can have an action for either a public or a private nuisance. ,42 In
other words, the harm must be substantial. Additionally, injuries suffered only
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 826(a). For particular applications of such balancing, see id.
§§ 829-31.
31 See id. § 827.
32 See id. § 828.
33 See id. § 826(b).
34 Id. § 829(b).
35 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 619-20 (listing examples of the kinds of harms alleged in
nuisance cases); see also infra at text accompanying notes 160-86 (analyzing these harms).
36 See Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988).
37 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
38 See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).
39 See Cluney v. Wai, 10 Haw. 319 (1896).
40 See Hansen v. Independent Sch. Dist., 98 P.2d 959 (Idaho 1939).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 74-95 (citing cases).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821F cmt. c; see also id. § 822 cmt. g. (acknowledging that "[i]t is
an obvious truth that each individual in a community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance,
inconvenience and interference and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on together").
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because a plaintiff
is especially sensitive to a particular activity are not treated
43
as nuisances.
There are few defenses to nuisance claims. Contributory negligence and
assumption of risk can operate to bar a plaintiff from objecting to conduct that
otherwise would be characterized as a nuisance, 44 but the actual application of
those doctrines is relatively rare. The most interesting, and most common,
defense contends that a plaintiff cannot object if he or she came to a nuisance
that was already there.45 The coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine has long been
controversial, with some decisions emphatically accepting it and others
emphatically rejecting it.46 The Restatement takes the middle position of
treating the47 question of temporal priority as one factor that is not itself
dispositive.
Public nuisances are "an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public. ' 48 The interference can be to public health, safety, peace,
morals, comfort, or convenience. 49 Unlike private nuisances, the interference
that amounts to a public nuisance does not always involve the use of land. At
common law, the diverse activities found to be public nuisances have included
keeping diseased animals, storing explosives,
obstructing a public highway,
50
and owning a house of prostitution. There are also many statutes that define
certain activities as constituting public nuisances, including uninhabitable
housing, infected crops, and itinerant carnivals. 5 1 While governmental
43 See id. § 821F, cmt. d (noting that the significance of the harm is judged from the perspective of
"normal persons living in the community," so injuries suffered by those who are hypersensitive to a particular
activity are not sufficient to establish a nuisance). I discuss the application of the hypersensitivity doctrine to
moral nuisances infra text accompanying notes 214-23.
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 840B (indicating that the availability of a contributory
negligence defense depends upon the nature of the defendant's conduct and whether such a defense is
available in negligence actions); id. § 840C (providing that assumption of risk "is a defense to the same extent
as in other tort actions").
45 See PROSSER& KEETON, supranote 19, at 634-36.
46 See generally iL at 634-36 (analyzing cases involving the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine).
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 840D (stating that "[t]he fact that the plaintiff has acquired or
improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it has come into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar
his action, but it is a factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is actionable").
43 Id. § 821B(l).
49 See id. § 821B(2)(a).
50 See, e.g., PROSSER, supranote 19, at 643-44 (citing cases).
5' See, e.g., ARsz. REV. STAT. § 3-202 (1995) ("All plants, soil and other things found infested or infected
with a crop pest or disease or which are the host or carrier or means of disseminating or propagating a crop
pest or disease is declared a public nuisance ....); MINN. STAT. § 145.1621 (1998) (providing that improper
disposal of an aborted or miscarried human fetus is a public nuisance); MiNN. STAT. § 624.65 (1998)
("Itinerant carnivals ... are hereby declared to be a public nuisance and are prohibited."); S.C. CODE ANN.
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authorities are empowered to bring public nuisance claims, private individuals
can also bring such claims if they show a special injury distinct from that
suffered by the public at large.52
The same activity can be treated as a private nuisance and as a public
nuisance. Thus the Restatement explains that "[w]hen the particular harm
consists of interference with the use and enjoyment of land, the public nuisance
may also be a private nuisance, as when a bawdy house that interferes with the
public morals and constitutes a crime also interferes with the use and
enjoyment of land next door. ' 53 This example is especially helpful because it
illustrates that the activities traditionally regarded as moral nuisances are
capable of enforcement both by governmental officials and by affected
neighbors.
Nuisance law also raises interesting remedial questions. Damages are
usually available to a plaintiff who proves a nuisance. 54 Injunctive relief is
available only when it is equitable to demand that the defendant stop her
conduct. 55 The Restatement says that the determination of whether an
injunction is appropriate depends upon a balancing of the harm caused by the
nuisance with the benefits of the defendant's activity.56 Increasingly, though,
courts use that same test to determine whether a nuisance exists in the first
place. That conflation of the remedy and the threshold determination of a
nuisance remains controversial, 57 and it complicates efforts to state a precise
§ 50-25-410 (Law. Co-op. 1992) ('The operation of motorboats upon the waters of Langley Lake in Aiken
County with exhausts, mufflers or cutouts open or by any other method or means whereby disturbing,
excessive and useless noises are produced by such operation is declared a public nuisance and is hereby
forbidden except on legal holidays.").
52 See RESTATEM1ENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821C(1) (explaining that "[iun order to recover damages in an
individual action for a public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by
other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of
interference"). For examples of private actions against public nuisances, see for example, Lewis v. General
Elec. Co. 37 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1999) (allowing property owners to bring a public nuisance suit
against toxic contamination); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125 (1991) (authorizing
property owners to bring a public nuisance suit against hazardous waste contamination); State v. Deines, 997
P.2d 705 (Kan. 2000) (holding that a private individual could remove wheat growing on a public road because
the wheat constituted a public nuisance).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B cmt. h.
54 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 637-40 (discussing the availability of damages in nuisance
cases).

55 See id. at 640 (discussing the test for injunctive relief against a nuisance).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 941 cmt. c.

57 See Eliickson, supranote 19, at 720-21 (complaining that "most courts applied the [balancing] test to
the initial question of whether a nuisance existed at all, incorrectly limiting the availability of damage awards
that would internalize the harmful externalities") (footnote omitted). The Restatement itself warned that
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test for moral nuisances in particular. An activity that could be regarded as a
nuisance based solely on its effects on the plaintiff may not be treated as a
nuisance if the defendant's perspective and other equitable factors are
considered as well.
This overview of nuisance law allows me to limit my consideration in the
balance of this Article. My theory of moral nuisances describes the ability of
private individuals and organizations to challenge a nearby activity as a
nuisance. Many such claims will involve private nuisances, but public
nuisance actions are relevant to the extent that an individual can show the kind
of special injury needed to bring such an action. Most of my attention is
devoted to common law nuisance determinations, though statutes that define
certain activities as nuisances are also useful to the extent that they allow
private actions. I am not concerned about the appropriate remedy hereusually injunctive relief or damages-though that decision will often be of
supreme importance to the neighbors who object to what is happening next
door.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S HARM
Virtually anything could constitute a nuisance because virtually anything
could interfere with somebody's use and enjoyment of her land. The reported
cases alone contain claims that a church, a group home for those suffering
from a contagious disease, 59 and the mere presence of an unmarried couple 6° or
an African-American family 61 are viewed as a nuisance through the eyes of
some neighbors. It is also conceivable that someone would regard the
proximity of Republicans or Democrats, gays or fundamentalists, or Mets fans
or Yankees fans, as a nuisance.
This is not what nuisance law is about. It is difficult, though, to identify
what nuisance law does address. The word "nuisance" derives from the French
word for "harm," 62 and nuisance law has never adequately explained which
harms can be remedied and which cannot. The best evidence of the kinds of

"con-iderations enter into the determination of the right to an injunction that are inapplicable or have less
weight in determining the right to damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 822 cmL d.
5 See Murphy v. Cupp, 31 S.W.2d 396 (Ark. 1930).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 165-77 (citing cases).
69 See Adams v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.1006 (Ky. 1915).
6t See Faloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292,297 (1883).
62 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS at 84.
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harms addressed by nuisance law lies in the results of the decided cases, rather
than in their reasoning.
Environmental nuisances often present the easiest cases. The injuries there
are more tangible and more readily measured. Groundwater contaminated by
water pollution causes various physical ailments when people drink it. Air
pollution causes neighboring residents to experience respiratory problems, and
it damages property exposed to toxic particles. Children playing in soil
contaminated by hazardous wastes face numerous threats to their physical and
mental development.
Sensory nuisances are more difficult. As detailed below, noises, lights, and63
odors can interfere with a variety of activities on a neighbor's property.
There are, however, few physical injuries or other readily measurable harms
resulting from such offenses to the senses. It is even harder to achieve a
consensus regarding the unsightliness associated with aesthetic nuisances,
which accounts for the judicial uncertainty about the legitimacy of such
nuisance claims.
The most difficult cases allege an offense to a claimant's moral
sensibilities. Mark and Powers' assertion that the nude beach and public
sexual activity occurring opposite their own property constituted a nuisance
offers an opportunity to examine the nature of the plaintiffs harm in moral
nuisance cases. The following three sections examine this issue. I first outline
three lines of cases that involve harms unlike the physical injuries often raised
in environmental nuisance cases. Second, I synthesize these cases and describe
which harms involved in moral nuisance cases are sufficient to support such a
claim, and which harms are not. Third, I consider the community's acceptance
of the moral beliefs giving rise to the claim.
A. The HarmsAsserted in Nuisance Cases
A number of activities have faced repeated challenges as nuisances. Three
groups of activities are of particular relevance in evaluating the harms
associated with moral nuisance claims. The first group of challenged
activities-houses of prostitution, saloons, and gambling parlors-are often
premised on activities that many view as morally objectionable, but which
have other harmful consequences, too. The second, and largest, group
demonstrates how sensory harms-noises, lights, smells, and aesthetics-have
63 See infra text accompanying notes 92-111.
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effects that can operate as a nuisance even when no physical injuries ensue. A
third group of challenged activities-the presence of cemeteries or funeral
homes, facilities that care for those with contagious diseases, and the stigma
attached to nearby environ-mental contamination that does not cause any
physical harms-shows the relevance of fears and emotional discomfort in
establishing a nuisance.
1. Old MoralNuisance Cases
The moral nuisances that were common in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries involved several kinds of harms to those people who lived
adjacent to them. Some of those harms are suffered by the general public, such
as the effect of public morality, and can be the subject of private action only
when an individual experiences some other special kind of harm. Other harms
are unique to moral complaints, such as the embarrassment and discomfort that
neighbors experience from living next to something like a house of
prostitution. Some harms are also characteristic of environmental and sensory
nuisances, such as loud noises and declining property value. These harms are
revealed in the objects of the three leading kinds of old moral nuisance cases:
houses of prostitution, saloons, and gambling parlors.
a. Prostitution
Brothels, houses of ill fame, bawdy houses, and houses of prostitution
appeared in many nineteenth century nuisance cases. Whatever the name, it
was agreed that they were a nuisance per se: a nuisance regardless of the time
or the place. 64 It was also generally agreed65that they could constitute either a
public nuisance, a private nuisance, or both.
The city of Portland offers an illustrative case decided exactly one hundred
years before the Oregon appeals court ruled on the nuisance claim in Mark. In
1890, N.J. Blagen built a four-story brick building in downtown Portland that
was rented by a company that made bags, tents, awnings, and sails. 66 Robert
Smith owned the land across the street where he built several small wooden
buildings that housed a number of Japanese women. Smith claimed that he
was simply providing low income housing for needy immigrants, but Blagen
insisted that the women were working as prostitutes. Blagen complained that
64 See Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 156 (1885); 1 WOOD, supranote 5, at 49.
65 See Tedeseki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961 (Ala. 1907).
6

Blagen v. Smith, 56 P. 292,293 (Or. 1899).
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the activities could be seen from his building, that his employees were being
corrupted, and that the value of his property had declined. The Oregon
Supreme Court agreed that Smith's use of his property constituted a
nuisance. 67 The special injury that entitled Blagen to sue for a public nuisance
was not the drop in property value, but rather the "disgusting scenes and
sounds" that "shock the sense
of those whose property, or the enjoyment
68
thereof, is affected thereby."
Blagen reflects the kinds of harms alleged in other prostitution cases.
Houses of prostitution were public nuisances because they were "detrimental
to the moral and social welfare of the public." 69 Such houses could constitute a
private nuisance, too, but the injury caused by the proximity to prostitution was
not often explained. The best indications are provided in the facts recited by
the courts in such cases. For example, the sight of the prostitutes or the
customers was offensive,70 as were their sounds. 71 Sometimes the activities
prevented neighbors from sleeping. 72 More generally, the objection was
simply to "riotous and indecent conduct., 73 These activities caused those
living in neighboring properties to be uncomfortable. 74 The impact on families
exposed to such activities received special note. 75 The presence of such
67
61
69
70

Id. at 294-96.
Id. at 296.
1WOOD,supranote 5, at 49 (citing cases).
See Farmer v. Behmer, 100 P. 901, 902 (Cal. 1909) (recounting allegations that the "'prostitutes
frequently exposed themselves openly and publicly at the windows of defendant's said house, and upon the
street, within sight of plaintiff's said dwelling, and in an immoral and indecent manner"'); Givens v. Van
Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 155 (1885) (noting that "the inmates indecently exposed themselves at the windows
next to plaintiff's property"); Crawford v. Tyrrell, 28 N.E. 514, 515 (N.Y. 1891) (reporting that "the persons
occupying the rooms ...indecently exposed their persons at the windows"); Weakley v. Page, 53 S.W. 551,
551-52 (Tenn. 1899) (detailing the testimony of several witnesses about the sight of naked men and women in
a house of prostitution); see also Dix W. Noel, Unaesthetic Sights As Nuisances,25 CoRNELL L.Q. 1, 2(1939)
(citing Crawford for the proposition that "[ilt has long been established that sights offensive to a sense of
decency may be enjoined").
71 See Farmer, 100 P. at 902 (noting that the prostitutes "indulged in vile and indecent and profane
language in a loud and boisterous manner, which was frequently heard by plaintiff' in his nearby residence);
Crawford, 28 N.E. at 515 (indicating that "the persons occupying the rooms acted in a boisterous and noisy
manner"); Weakley, 53 S.W. at 551-52 (describing testimony complaining about the noises coming from a
house of prostitution).
72 See Farmer, 101 P. at 902 (noting that the sleep of those living near a house of prostitution "was
frequently disturbed and interrupted"); Weakley, 53 S.W. at 552 (reporting the testimony of a witness who
complained "that respectable people cannot sleep and rest in the neighborhood").
73 Tedescki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961 (Ala. 1907).
74 See Crawford, 28 N.E. at 515 (explaining that the plaintiffs "have been interfered with and rendered
uncomfortable" and "annoyed and seriously disturbed").
75 See Weakley, 53 S.W. at 552-53 (describing the concerns expressed by several witnesses about the
effects of the house ofprostitution on their families, including a woman with six children who reported that the
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activity harmed the neighborhood. It also caused the value of the adjacent
property to decline.7 6 It made it impossible to rent the adjacent property.7 7

By contrast, the courts did not regard the mere occurrence of private sexual
activity as sufficient to constitute a nuisance. Wood explained that neither
"mere solicitation of chastity" nor a woman who "admits one or many persons
to her room to have illicit intercourse with" her fit within the common law
on houses of prostitution.7 8 The only contrary case has never been
prohibition
79
followed.

The courts, moreover, encountered concerns about the enforcement of
moral objections to houses of prostitution early on. In Hamilton v. Whittridge,
the Maryland Supreme Court responded to the suggestion that it was
inappropriate for the courts to find a nuisance based on "what is offensive to
the moral sense" 80 as follows:
We need not inquire how far this jurisdiction can be founded on
grounds of morality, and to preserve the decencies of life from gross
violation.... But it would be strange, indeed, if when the court's
powers are invoked for the protection and enjoyment of property, and
may be rightfully exercised for that purpose, its arm should be
paralyzed by the mere circumstance that, in the exercise of this
jurisdiction, it might incidentally perform the functions of a moral
censor, by suppressing a shocking vice denounced by the law, and
amendable to its penalties from the earliest times. And if, as the
authorities show, the court may interfere where the physical senses
are offended, the comfort of life destroyed, or health impaired, these
alone being the basis of jurisdiction, the present complainants,

presenting, as they do, a case otherwise entitling them to relief,
should not be disappointed merely because the effect of the process

women "are up all night singing, drinking, cursing, fighting, throwing bottles, going undressed, acting
indecently with men, and generally debauching the neighborhood"); Marsan v. French, 61 Tex. 173, 175
(1884) (asserting that the presence of a neighboring house of prostitution rendered the plaintiff's house "unfit
for a home for himself and his family").
76 See Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 155 (1885) (describing the decline in property value
attributable to the presence of the house of prostitution next door).
77 See Givens v. Van Studdiford, 4 Mo. App. 498, 500 (1877) (recounting that the house next to the
prostitutes "could be rented to no decent family"), aff'd, 72 Mo. 129 (1880); Weakley, 53 S.W. at 553
(concluding that the house of prostitution "very materially injures the rental value of property in the
neighborhood"); Marsan, 61 Tex. at 175 (noting that the plaintiff "alleged his property was diminished in
value" because of the adjacent house of prostitution).
78 1WOOD,supra note 5, at 56.
7) See Adams v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W. 1006 (Ky. 1915).
o Hamilton v. Whittridge, 11 Md. 128, 147 (1857).
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will be to protect their families from the moral taint of such an
establishment
as the appellant proposes to open in their immediate
81
vicinity.
b. Saloons
Saloons can be a nuisance. Unlike houses of prostitution, though, saloons
are nuisances only if they are located in the wrong place. 82 Again, the injuries
associated with proximity to a saloon are not often detailed. The most notable
exception occurred when the Louisiana Supreme Court described the injuries
resulting from the activities of a concert saloon located next to two expensive
new hotels that contended that:
[T]he female employ'es of the defendant dressed immodestly,
enticed the men frequenting the establishment to drink with them,
leading to indecent familiarities; that the establishment opened in the
evening, remained open at night, devoted to drinking and debauchery
of the women and men; that these excesses led to disorderly conduct,
frequent arrests at night, occasioning unpleasant scenes at the
entrance of the place on the street, annoying to the residents, and
interrupting their sleep; that the fascinations of the establishment
attracted vicious and disreputable people; that the theatrical
performances there were indecent and could be seen from the street;
that the women, with their lewd style of dressing, exhibited
themselves so as to be seen from the premises of petitioners, or some
83
of them, were forced on their attention ....
The most common complaint targeted the economic loss either from the
decline in property value or the lesser rents that can be collected from property
located near a saloon. 84 Saloons are also objectionable because of the

81 Id. at 147-48; see also Weakley, 53 S.W. at 555.
82 See Swift v. Illinois ex rel. Powers, 63 111.App. 453, 460 (1896) (rejecting the claim that there is a
right to keep a saloon in any part of a city); Commonwealth v. McDonough, 95 Mass. 581, 584 (1866)
(distinguishing saloons from houses of prostitution because only the latter were nuisances under all
circumstances).
83 Koehl v. Schoenhausen, 17 So. 809, 809 (La. 1895).
84 See Mayflower Holding Co. v. Warrick, 196 So. 428, 428 (Fla. 1940) (describing business losses
experienced by a hotel because of noise from an adjacent night club); Kissel v. Lewis, 59 N.E. 478,481 (Ind.
1901) (noting the possibile reduction in the value of residential property located near a beer garden); Haggart
v. Stehlin, 35 N.E. 997, 998 (Ind. 1893) (describing the loss in property value and rental value resulting from
proximity to a saloon located in a residential section of Indianapolis); Koehl, 17 So. at 810 (stating that "[t]he
depreciation of the property of others arising from the use one makes of his own is another element of
nuisance"); Nebraska ex reL Towle v. Eyen, 264 N.W. 901, 901 (Neb. 1936) (noting that a tavern rendered

nearby property "valueless").
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troublesome people whom they attract. 85 Noises are another problem associthat a nearby
ated with a saloon. 86 More generally, neighbors have argued
87
saloon interfered with their ability to use their own property.
c. Gambling Parlors

The common law treated gambling houses as nuisances per se.88 Gambling
houses disturbed the peace, 89 and had bad effects on the character of those who
visited such establishments. 90 These injuries were usually viewed as related to
a public nuisance, and private efforts to respond to those harms9 1 could fail
because plaintiffs had not demonstrated the requisite special injury.
2. Sensory Harms

A long list of cases establishes that sensory harms can support a nuisance
claim. Loud noises and offensive smells are frequently characterized as
nuisances. Bright lights can cause a nuisance, too, although there are fewer
cases involving lights than there are cases involving noises or smells.
Aesthetic objections produce the most controversial sensory cases. The idea
that a nuisance can result simply because an activity is unsightly in the eyes of

5 See Taylor v. Alabama ex rel. Adams, 155 So. 2d 595,596 (Ala. 1963) (describing public drunkenness
outside a tavern); Steinberg v. Colorado ex rel. Keating, 390 P.2d 811, 811 (Colo. 1964) (noting that a tavern
had attracted "prostitutes and other undesirables"); Pfingst v. Senn, 23 S.W. 358, 359 (Ky. 1893) (noting that
the people who had been hanging around a previous facility had been bothering the neighbors); Sipe v. Dale,
80 P.2d 569, 571 (Okla. 1938) (noting the congregation of drunk people at a beer parlor and dance hall).
86 See Taylor, 155 So.2d at 596 (referring to the noise coming from a beer tavern).
87 See Hunnicut v. Eaton, 191 S.E. 919 (Ga. 1937) (indicating that a bar and dance hall had prevented
neighbors from enjoying their homes); Feeney v. Bartoldo, 30 A. 1101, 1101-02 (N.J. Ch. 1895) (noting that a
piano played in a saloon late at night had disturbed the sleep of neighboring residents); Sipe, 80 P.2d at 571
(describing how a beer parlor and dance hall had interfered with neighbors' sleep and their general enjoyment
of their property).
8 See Ehrlick v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W. 289, 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907); Commonwealth v. Ciccone,
85 Pa. Super. 316, 319 (1925).
89 See Engle v. State, 90 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. 1939) (citing the allegation that a gambling house "was
then and there indecent and offensive to public decency"); People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 473 (Cal. 1941)
(reciting a complaint's allegation that gambling houses disturbed the public peace).
'0 See Lim, 118 P.2d at 473 (noting a complaint's allegations that a gambling house "encourag[ed] idle
and dissolute habits" and "corrupt[ed] the public morals"); People ex rel. L'Abbe v. District Court of Lake
County, 58 P. 604, 604 (Colo. 1899) (describing the allegation made by the president of the Leadville
Women's Christian Temperance Union that the more than 40 gambling houses in the town were leading
husbands and fathers astray and generally causing "the deterioration of the moral tone" of the community).
91 See L'Abbe, 58 P. at 605 (dismissing a private nuisance action against Leadville's gambling houses
because "it was a plain attempt, through the aid of a court of equity, to prevent the violation of the penal
statutes of the state").
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a neighbor has yet to achieve widespread acceptance, notwithstanding the fact
that such aesthetic concerns now usually support zoning decisions.
Obviously, not all sounds, smells, lights, or sights constitute a nuisance. As
with other nuisances, a sensory nuisance exists only if the noise, smell, light, or
sight occurs at a magnitude, duration, or location that causes a substantial
interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. But the precise
kinds of interferences caused by such sensory offenses are rarely explained in
any detail in the cases or in the academic literature.
a. Noises

Noises are one of the most common kinds of nuisances. Noises from a
wide variety of causes have been deemed nuisances, including trucks,
industrial facilities, gas stations, barking dogs, music, windmills, and loud
92
voices.
are have
the been
most affected
frequent
victims
of noisy
93
interferences,Residential
but churcheshomes
and farms
as well.
The harm caused by noises is usually described in terms of the activities
that a neighbor cannot perform because of the noise. Loss of sleep is perhaps
the most frequent complaint, which demonstrates that the characterization of94a
noise as a nuisance often depends upon the time of day at which it occurs.
92 See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1952)
(concluding that noises from a compressor gas station next to residences and a farm amounted to a nuisance);
McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apartments, Ltd., 543 P.2d 150, 152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that concerts
held at a shopping center constituted a nuisance because of the loud music and large crowds); Helmkamp v.
Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126, 128-30 (Iowa 1974) (holding that a cement plant constituted a
nuisance in part because of noises from jackhammers operated in the morning and the evening); Fox v. Ewers,
75 A.2d 357 (Md. 1950) (holding that the noises from trucks next to a residential home constituted a
nuisance); Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (holding that the noise from the
operation of a windmill was a nuisance); Zang v. Engle, No. 0OAP-290, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4222 (Sept.
19, 2000) (holding that a neighbor's barking dogs constituted a nuisance); McPherson v. First Presbyterian
Church, 248 P. 561, 563-66 (Okla. 1926) (finding that the noises from cars visiting a gas station constituted a
nuisance because they would disturb services at a neighboring church); Kestner v. Homeopathic Med. &
Surgical Hosp., 91 A. 659, 661 (Pa. 1914) (finding that the "shrieks and screams" ofpatients at a hospital were
a nuisance); Estancia Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that noises from
an apartment's air conditioning equipment constituted a nuisance).
93 See, e.g., Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U.S. 568 (1891) (church); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 198 F.2d at 197 (farms and residences); Fox, 75 A.2d at 358-61 (residential
home).
94 See Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 821 (Ga. 1934) (noting that the noises from a nearby
airport interfered with the plaintiff's sleep); Redd v. Edna Cotton Mills, 48 S.E. 761, 761-62 (N.C. 1904)
(describing an allegation that the blowing of a steam whistle at 4:30 a.m. awakened a neighboring resident);
Christensen v. Hilltop Sportsman Club, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ohio App. 1990) (holding that the noise
from a shooting range constituted a qualified nuisance because it occurred early in the morning and late into
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Noises also interfere with meals, entertainment, religious services, and other
uses.95 More generally, neighbors have alleged that noises disturb the
comfortable enjoyment of their property, especially their homes. There are
just a few
cases in which it was alleged that noises caused any physical
97
injuries.

Of course, not every noise constitutes a nuisance. The harms described
above must be substantial, and many noises have failed to cross that
threshold. 98 With few exceptions, though, the debate in noise cases involves
the severity of the harm caused by the noise,
not whether the particular kind of
99
harm is cognizable under nuisance law.
b. Odors
There have long been cases alleging that certain odors constituted a
nuisance. Many of these cases involve smells from farms that are not
100
appreciated by nearby residents, particularly newcomers to the community.
the night); Kestner,91 A. at 660-61 (noting that residents lost sleep because of "shrieks and screams" from an
adjacent hospital); Sherrod v. Dutton, 635 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Tenn. App. 1982) (explaining that noises from a
go-cart racetrack constituted a nuisance because a "a certain amount of noise... is not only disagreeable, but
it also wears upon the nervous system and produces that feeling which we call 'tired"') (quoting Gilbough v.
West Side Amusement Co., 53 A. 289, 289 (N.J. Ch. 1902)).
95 See Baltimore & P.R. Co., 137 U.S. at 568 (noting that noises from an engine house disturbed the
congregation in the neighboring church); Anne Arundel County Fish & Game Conservation Ass'n v. Carlucci,
573 A.2d 847, 849 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (noting testimony that the noise from a shooting club frightened
a child and prevented "sleeping, reading, watching television or any other activity which requires
concentration"); Kestner, 91 A. at 660 (indicating that the hospital's noises interfered with a neighbor's
meals).
96 See TranscontinentalGas Pipe Line Corp., 198 F.2d at 198 (noting that noises from a compressor gas
station interfered with neighbors' enjoyment of their homes); Nair v. Thaw, 242 A.2d 757, 761 (Conn. 1968)
(enjoining the operation of an air conditioner during the night because it interfered with a neighbor's use and
enjoyment of his home); Town of Stonington v. Galilean Gospel Temple, 722 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Me. 1999)
(finding that an allegation that noise from a quarry interfered with the ability of neighboring residents to enjoy
their homes stated a nuisance claim).
97 See, e.g., Redd, 48 S.E. at 761-62 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation that the blowing of a steam whistle
was "seriously impairing their health").
9' See, e.g., Layton v. Yankee Caithness Joint Venture, 774 F. Supp. 576,581 (D. Nev. 1991) (rejecting a
nuisance claim against the noises from a geothermal power plant because "[insubstantial problems do not
constitute nuisances").
99 But see Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W. 2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1943) (holding that the noise
created by a large ventilating fan at a bread company was not a nuisance because there was "a total failure of
proof of actual physical damage to the [plaintiff's] house").
10 See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (finding a statutory nuisance
where a cattle feedlot was situated near a new retirement community); Michael v. Michael, 461 N.W.2d 334,
334-35 (Iowa 1990) (describing the odors resulting from a hog confinement operation spreading manure slurry
a quarter mile upwind from the plaintiff's house).
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Odors from sewage treatment plants and industrial facilities are frequent
sources of complaints from neighbors as well.' 0 The plaintiffs offended by
smells from a nearby activity apparently are almost always the residents of
nearby homes.
The harm caused by odors is even less capable of a precise description than
the harm caused by noises. Occasionally some specific use is affected by the
existence of an unwanted smell. 102 Only rarely does an odor result in an actual
physical injury to human health. 103 Instead, neighbors object to certain odors
because they are unpleasant. 104 These kinds of assertions often fail to establish
that the defendant's activity constitutes a nuisance, either because the extent of
the unpleasantness is not substantial enough to quality as a nuisance, or
because who was there first seems particularly important when judging the
offense caused by unpleasant smells.

101 See Foreign Car Center, Inc. v. Salem Suede, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (determining
that emissions and odors from a leather finishing plant were a nuisance); Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964,
967 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a plant that packaged soil conditioner constituted a nuisance because of
the "odors, dust, noise, and flies"); Lever v. Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 692, 693 (S.C. App. 1984)
(holding that the smells caused by improper maintenance of a sewage treatment lagoon were a nuisance).
102 See Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761, 763 (Ala. 1974) (indicating that odors from a large hog
farm "caused loss of appetite and practically ruined all outdoor recreation"); Atlantic Processing Co. v. Brown,
179 S.E.2d 752, 754 (Ga. 1971) (stating that neighbors complained that odors from an animal rendering plant
interfered with their sleep, destroyed their appetites, and made them "very irritable, upset and nervous");
Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 139 So. 2d 632, 633 (Miss. 1962) (noting allegation that odors from an
animal rendering plant made it impossible for nearby residents to eat, sleep, or use their homes and yards);
Padilla,685 P.2d at 967 (noting testimony that the odor from a soil conditioner packaging plant "prohibited
cooking in the summer, prevented use of evaporative cooling, and generally interfered with normal residential
activities"); Barnes v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Bartlesville, 987 P.2d 430 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999)
(recounting testimony that a resident "is no longer able to enjoy sitting on the front porch to have a morning
cup of coffee because of the odor created by" a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig).
103 See Baldwin, 288 So. 2d at 763 (noting that neighbors reported that the odors from a hog farm
"sickened them at the stomach"); Padilla,685 P.2d at 967 (recounting a plaintiff's testimony that "the odor
and dust [have] caused him to have nosebleeds and fits of choking").
104 See, e.g., Francisco v. Department of Insts. & Agencies, 180 A. 843, 844 (N.J. Ch. 1935) (describing
the "harm, annoyance and great discomfiture" experienced by residents who objected to anesthesia, laundry,
and cooking smells from the neighboring hospital); see generally 2 WOOD, supranote 4, at 59 (indicating that
smells can constitute a nuisance simply because they are disagreeable).
105 See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. WVebb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706-08 (Ariz. 1972) (relying on the
coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine in fashioning a remedy for a cattle feedlot that constituted a nuisance to a new
retirement community); Tlhiel v. Cernin, 276 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ark. 1955) (holding that odors from a broiler
house do not result in a nuisance because the broiler house was well constructed and the odors were not bad
enough to warrant an injunction); Francisco, 180 A. at 844-49 (holding that a private hospital did not
constitute a nuisance because the hospital was there first and the plaintiff's injury was not sufficiently severe to
warrant an injunction).
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c. Lights
Bright lights are less frequently a source of complaints in nuisance cases.
The relatively few decisions have involved lights from signs and recreational
activities. 106 Structures that reflect light have also been targeted."' In each

instance, the harm caused by the light was its interference with a particular use,
most often sleep. 1°8 There have also been allegations that excessive light
reduced the value of a neighbor's property. 1°9 Again, the success of these
claims depends upon the extent of the interference caused by the light, which
itself often depends upon the particular location and expectations about
reasonable nighttime uses.'
The cases alleging that bright lights constitute a
nuisance are also likely to be accompanied by allegations of other harms,
especially noises.'

106 See Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 570 (Ark. 1994) (enjoining a homeowner's large display of
Christmas lights because it generated so much traffic); Akers v. Marsh, 19 App. D.C. 28 (1901) (residents
objecting to the small oil torches illuminating a neighbor's midnight croquet games); Hansen v. Independent
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 98 P.2d 959 (Idaho 1939) (residential neighbors objecting to the lights from a baseball
stadium); Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 216 N.E. 788, 790 (Ill. 1966)
(drive-in theater objecting to the lights at a highway oasis); Neiman v. Common Sch. Dist. No. 95, 232 P.2d
422, 424 (Kan. 1951) (residents complaining about lights from a school's softball game); Shelbume, Inc. v.
Crossan Corp., 122 A. 749, 749-51 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (hotel guests complaining about an outdoor lighted sign);
Edmunds v. Duff, 124 A. 489, 491 (Pa. 1924) (residents concerned about the lights from a proposed
amusement park); Maxwell v. Lax, 292 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) (residents objecting to light from a
large advertising sign).
107 See Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., 278 P. 757, 757-58 (Kan. 1929) (sunlight reflected from grain
tanks that were painted white).
106 See Akers, 19 App. D.C. at 28 (alleging a neighbor's lights interfered with sleep); Shelburne, Inc., 122
A. at 750 (holding an outdoor sign interferes with the comfort of guests in an adjacent hotel); Edmunds, 124 A.
at 489 (alleging that a proposed amusement park would interfere "with the comfort and enjoyment of their
homes by residents of the neighborhood"); Maxwell, 292 S.W.2d at 225 (noting that a lighted sign disrupted
the ability of neighbors to sleep).
109 See Shepler, 278 P. at 757 (stating homeowners argued that reflected sunlight rendered their house
"unsaleable" and "untenantable"); Shelburne, Inc., 122 A. at 750 (stating that the hotel argued that a lighted
outdoor sign affects its business).
110 See Akers, 19 App. D.C. at 28 (concluding that the offending lights were no more objectionable than
normal streetlights); Bagko Develop. Co. v. Damitz, 640 N.E.2d 67, 72-73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
lights from a Little League practice field were not sufficiently offensive to constitute a nuisance).
111See Akers, 19 App. D.C. at 28 (objecting to the lights, odors and noises from a neighbor's midnight
croquet games); Hansen, 98 P.2d at 962 (noting objections to lights, noise, and trespassers attending nighttime
baseball games); Parker v. Ashford, 661 So. 2d 213,215 (Ala. 1995) (residents objecting to the light and noise
from a proposed racetrack).
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d. Aesthetics

Traditionally, aesthetic complaints were insufficient to establish a nuisance.
As Wood explained over a century ago, "the law will not declare a thing a
nuisance because it is unpleasant to the eye."' 1 2 The courts repeatedly rejected
assertions that aesthetic objections to junk yards, fences, and other unsightly
things rendered those activities a nuisance.113 The basis for those decisions
was the reluctance of courts to find that offenses to one's
sense of aesthetics
1 14

constituted an injury that could be remedied by the courts.

The cases rejecting aesthetic nuisances are now in tension with other areas
of the law. Aesthetic concerns were once held insufficient to support zoning
laws, but the modem trend is to uphold zoning conducted for aesthetic
116
purposes.1 15 Other areas of the law now address aesthetic concerns, too.
Moreover, several academic commentators have favored the acceptance of
aesthetic nuisance cases. For example, Raymond Coletta has argued that "it
seems somewhat incongruous to allow individuals redress for offenses to their
senses of hearing and smell, but at the same time deny them a remedy for
offenses to their sense of sight."11 7 Coletta has reconceptualized the harms at
issue in aesthetic nuisance cases, explaining that aesthetic nuisances harm
11 8
landowners by depriving them of the cultural identity of their neighborhood.

112 1 WOOD, supra note 5, at 24; see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1331 (2000) (explaining
that "because tastes differ and criteria for aesthetic judgment are deemed unreliable, courts have been reluctant
to say that an inappropriate and ugly sight can be a nuisance"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 626 &
n.3 (indicating that "mere unsightliness" does not constitute a nuisance, but that "[alesthetic considerations...
play an important part in determining reasonable use").
113 See, e.g., Bixby v. Cravens, 156 P. 1184, 1187 (Okla. 1916) (holding that an unsightly fence did not
constitute a nuisance because landowners are "not compelled to consult the 'aesthetic taste' of their neighbors"
when building a fence); Mathewson v. Primeau, 395 P.2d 183, 189 ('Wash. 1964) (holding that the
unsightliness of a pig farm did not create a nuisance); State Road Comm'n v. Oakes, 149 S.E.2d 293, 300 (W.
Va. 1966) (rejecting a nuisance claim against the storage of rubbish near a road).
114 See generally Raymond Robert Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional
JudicialAttitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 145-48 (1987) (explaining that courts refused to find a nuisance based
on mere unsightliness because of the belief that aesthetic harms are subjective and de minimis).
115 See DWYER & MENELL, supra note 2, at 921 (concluding that aesthetic zoning is "now generally
recognized as a valid police power").
116 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (holding that aesthetic concerns can justify a
use of the government's eminent domain power); see generally Coletta, supranote 113, at 159 & n. 111 (citing
cases illustrating that "many federal and state courts have upheld a wide variety of aesthetically oriented
regulations" since Berman).
117 Coletta, supra note 114, at 165-66. Coletta adds that "there is no physiological reason for treating
visual perceptions any differently from noise or smell." Id. at 166.
118 See id. at 153.
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He also cites social and
psychological studies finding a link between aesthetics
19
and emotional health.
These arguments have resulted in increasing judicial acceptance of
aesthetic nuisance claims.12 0 The cases also contain novel assertions of the
harm caused by unsightly activities on a neighbor's property. One landowner,
for example, asserted that the view of wrecked cars on a neighbor's lot made
him self-conscious and unwilling to invite friends over for cookouts."' Yet
the reluctance to rely upon 1unsightliness
as an injury giving rise to a nuisance
22
still endures in some courts.
3. Fears
A third line of cases illustrates the relevance of fears and emotional distress
as a basis for a nuisance claim. The fears in these cases differ from the fear of
physical injury resulting from contaminated groundwater or polluted air that
exists in many environmental nuisance cases. Instead, these fears include the
reminder of human mortality caused by the proximity to a cemetery or a
funeral home, the fear of illness caused by proximity to a hospital or group
home containing people with potentially contagious diseases, and the stigma
resulting from the fear of environmental pollution even when that pollution
cannot reach the plaintiff's property. Again, these cases often contain
allegations of other harms as well, which complicates the determination of
precisely which harms suffice in the eyes of the court for establishing a
nuisance.

11 See id at 159-60. For other academic arguments for judicial recognition of aesthetic nuisances, see
JJ. Dukeminier, Jr., Zoning for Aesthetics Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CoNmrMP. PROBS. 218
(1955); Noel, supranote 70; Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause ofAction, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075
(1970).
120 For additional examples, see Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo.Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the storage of automobiles, scrap metal, and lots of other materials in a residential area constituted a nuisance);
Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 190-91 (Va. 1982) (insisting that aesthetic concerns can interfere with the use
and enjoyment of land and are protected by nuisance law).
121 See Foley, 286 S.E.2d at 188.
122 See Oklejas v. Williams, 302 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. CL App. 1983) (rejecting the claim that the unsightliness
of a wall constituted a nuisance); Carroll v. Hurst, 431 N.E.2d 1344, 1349 (ii. App. Ct. 1982) (rejecting the
claim that a junkyard and salvage operation constituted a nuisance because "[n]o testimony was given that
defendant's use of his land created an unsightly view; indeed, under Illinois law, a landowner does not have a
right to a pleasing view of his neighbor's land"); Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the presence of several dilapidated appliances and other refuse was not a nuisance because of the
subjective nature of aesthetic considerations).
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a. Cemeteries and FuneralHomes

During a period from about 1910 to 1960, many landowners alleged that
the presence of a cemetery or a funeral home in a residential neighborhood
constituted a nuisance. 123 Several different kinds of injuries have been
asserted. In the cemetery cases, the objection is sometimes to the possible
effects on groundwater from improper burials, a typical kind of environmental
harm that need not concern us here. 124 Funeral homes used to give rise 1to
complaints about the odors associated with the embalming process. 2
Likewise, neighbors have objected to cemeteries because of the increased
traffic and consequent danger to children
126 that results, a threat that also arises
from a host of other unrelated facilities.
The unique harm in the cemetery and funeral home cases involves the
emotional injury resulting from the "constant reminder of death." 127 Or, to put
it more grandiously, a cemetery serves "as an unwelcome reminder of that
'undiscover'd country from whose no bourn no traveller returns."'' 128 Such
123 As late as 1926, one writer confidently predicted that there were no cases in which a cemetery was
deemed a nuisance by virtue of its location alone because "[n]o association would think of buying up real
estate in a residential district and converting it into a cemetery." D.F.J. Lynch, Restricting the Location of
Undertaking Establishments, 14 GEO. W. 352, 355 (1926). The most recent nuisance case involving a
cemetery was decided in 1998. See Barrett v. Lambert, No. 97-CA-00055 SCT, 1998 Miss. LXIS 364, at --6*8 (July 30, 1998) (holding that a church cemetery is not a nuisance because there was no argument that the
cemetery could affect public health).
124 See, e.g., Hall v. Moffett, 170 S.E. 192, 193 (Ga. 1933) (explaining that "[o]ne of the chief grounds
upon which injunction against the establishment of a burial ground has been granted at the instance of owners
of adjoining tracts of land is that where either the flow of water from the burying ground may contaminate the
water of adjoining premises, or the air may become contaminated"); McCaw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457,
457-58 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (concluding that a proposed cemetery would not contaminate the groundwater
used by adjacent dairy farms); Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640, 643 (1927) (indicating that a cemetery
constitutes a nuisance if it pollutes the water or the air); Saier v. Joy, 164 N.W. 507 (Mich. 1917) (holding that
a funeral home constituted a nuisance in part because noxious gases reached neighboring houses); Jones v.
Highland Mem'l Park, 242 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. Civ, App. 1951) (concluding that there was insufficient
evidence that a cemetery would contaminate the groundwater).
125 See Mutual Serv. Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 48 So. 2d 26,27 (Ala. 1950) (describing the foul odors that
reach adjacent premises); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Mich. 1951) (noting allegations "that
unpleasant odors and contagious diseases will emanate from the funeral home").
126 See Mutual Serv. FuneralHomes, 48 So. 2d at 27 (noting allegation of increased traffic associated
with a funeral home); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 64 A.2d 814, 815 (Pa. 1949) (noting the allegation that a
cemetery "will result [in] an increase in the automobile traffic in the neighborhood with consequent danger to
children").
127 Potter v. Bryan Funeral Home, 817 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Ark. 1991); see also Howard v. Etchieson, 310
S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958); Overby v. Piet, 163 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Frederick v.
Brown Funeral Homes, 62 So. 2d 100, 101 (La. 1952); Rockenbach, 47 N.W.2d at 638, 640.
"' Young, 64 A.2d at 817 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAmLET, act III, sc. 1); see also Hardin, 6
La. App. at 641 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation that "a cemetery will subject them and their families to the

20011

MORAL NUISANCES

reminders result in additional consequences. A South Carolina court concluded that proximity to a funeral home resulted in "depression, nervousness,
lying awake at night, children made excited, children alarmed and insisting on
sleeping with their parents, families changing their sleeping quarters, families
ceasing to use their porches as open air dining rooms, [and] ceasing to use their
129
sitting rooms that are directly opposite the undertaking establishment."'

Similarly, a California couple objected that the sight of a proposed funeral
home would have "a dampening effect" on their use of their backyard for
picnics and parties "and
would in all probability cause their friends to refrain
130
from visiting them."'
The ill effects of the sight of a cemetery or a funeral home are not the only
harms that such facilities cause. The presence of mourners can elicit similar
concerns. 131 A cemetery can be objectionable if it becomes unsightly from
lack of maintenance. 132 Cemeteries and funeral homes were both said to cause
a decline in property values. 133 Finally, there have been a34number of more
sensational objections to cemeteries that merit little analysis.1
constant evidences and reminders of their own mortality"); Young, 64 A.2d at 815 (reporting the allegation
"that the frequent sight of funerals and the knowledge that dead bodies are about to be buried will be a
constant irritation to plaintiffs and will likely affect their health"); DeBorde v. St. Michael & All Angels
Episcopal Church, 252 S.E.2d 876, 882 (S.C. 1979) (observing that "[elmotions caused by the constant
reminder ofdeath may be just as acute in their painfulness as suffering perceived through the senses") (quoting
Young v. Brown, 46 S.E.2d 673, 679 (S.C. 1948)); Lynch, supra note 122, at 352 (describing the injury as
"mental depression suffered by the plaintiffs from the ever present reminder of the mortality of man"). For a
bizarre combination of the fear of death and water pollution concerns, see Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785,
788 (Fla. 1954) (asserting that "[w]e know of no one who would not object to the thought of drinking water
that had been drawn from a surface so near the dead, no matter how pure the health authorities had stated it to
be").
129 Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 21 S.E.2d 577, 580 (S.C. 1942) (quoting the opinion of the
common pleas court).
130 Brown v. Arbuckle, 198 P.2d 550, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
131 See Young, 64 A.2d at 815 (observing that "the frequent visits to the site by relatives and friends of
those interred therein will be a source off annoyance to" the neighbors). Brown explained that:
There is the passage of the funeral procession with its mourners and the last rites at the grave
followed by frequent visits of the bereaved persons, all of which are conducive to depression and
sorrow and when constantly recurring in close proximity to a residence may deprive the home of
the comfort and repose to which the owner is entitled.
46 S.E.2d at 679; see also Trawick, 75 So. 2d at 789 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting "the extreme lament of
the colored mourners"); Overby, 163 So. 2d at 533 (characterizing Trawick as a case in which "the noisy
lamenting of the Negro mourners was a source of disturbance to at least one plaintiff').
132 See Woodstock Burial Ground Ass'n v. Hagen, 35 A. 431,432 (Vt. 1896) (describing a cemetery as
"unsightly" because of the presence of weeds and the need for grading).
"I See Howard, 310 S.W.2d at 474 (observing "that establishment of the funeral home would lower the
value of appellees' properties"); Trawick, 75 So. 2d at 788 (taking judicial notice "that a lot in a subdivision
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Such claims met a mixed reception in the courts during their heyday in the
first half of the twentieth century. 135 There has long been a consensus that a
cemetery is not a nuisance per se-largely because of the need for
cemeteries-so the conclusion that a particular cemetery constitutes a nuisance
depends upon its location and the other facts of the case. 136 The disagreement
often reflected contrasting judgments of the force of the concerns about
constant reminders of death. The pro-nuisance view accepted such concerns as
legitimate and as eligible for redress by the law. 137 The anti-nuisance view
denied that the law should enforce such biases. 138 The earliest cases reflected

near a cemetery would at least not be as readily resaleable as one not adjoining a cemetery"); Rockenbach v.
Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Mich. 1951) (concluding "that property values would be substantially depressed
for residential purposes by the proposed establishment of the funeral home"); Jones v. Chapel Hill, 77
N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (N.Y. 1948) (noting the large depreciation in property values that would be caused by a
funeral home); Jones v. Highland Mem'l Park, 242 S.V.2d 250,253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (holding that a loss
of property values cannot support the conclusion that a cemetery is a nuisance).
134 See Young, 64 A.2d at 816 (recounting testimony that a cemetery "might make it difficult 'to keep
colored help' and that "'the type of people who dig the graves might easily be a nuisance as well as a menace
to the children walking back and forth"'); Fraser,21 S.E.2d at 579 (reprinting the trial court's determination
that a funeral home "has apparently weakened their powers to resist disease" for some of the neighbors).
135 For cemeteries, compare Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785, 786-88 (Fla. 1954) (holding that a cemetery
was a nuisance), with Antenucci v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 114 A.2d 216,220 (Conn. 1955)
(holding that a cemetery was not a nuisance); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 64 A.2d 814, 816-17 (Pa. 1949)
(same); DeBorde v. St. Michael & All Angels Episcopal Church, 252 S.E.2d 876, 881-84 (S.C. 1979) (same);
Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 174 P. 961, 962-63 (Wash. 1918) (same). For funeral homes, compare
Brown, 198 P. at 551-53 (holding that a funeral home is a nuisance); Travis v. Moore, 377 So. 2d 609, 612
(Miss. 1979) (same); Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 21 S.E.2d 577, 595-94 (S.C. 1942) (same), with
Devereux v. Grand-Americas Jr. Corp., 85 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding that a funeral
home is not a nuisance); Fraser,21 S.E.2d at 585 (same).
136 See, e.g., Harper v. City of Nashville, 70 S.E.1102, 1103 (Ga. 1911) (noting that "[c]emeteries are a
necessity," so "[c]emeteries are not per se nuisances, and it is only in exceptional cases that their establishment
and location would be enjoined by a court of equity").
137 See Brown v. Arbuckle, 198 P.2d 550,553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (concluding that a funeral home "has
a depressing effect upon most people," deprives "a home of the comfort and repose to which its owners are
entitled," and can cause mental strain with attendant direct physical manifestations); Trawick, 75 So. 2d at 785
(holding that a cemetery constituted a nuisance because "[t]he constant reminders of death, the depression of
mind, would.., deprive the home of that comfort and repose to which its owner is entitled by law").
138 See Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, 62 So. 2d 100, 108 (La. 1952) (Le Blanc, J., dissenting)
(contending that where "it is only the individual's personal emotions that are involved, they have to yield to
the greater rights of a property owner which are [involved]"); Hardin v. Huckabay, 6 La. App. 640, 645 (1927)
(asserting that "[m]ere undesirableness by means of social or other prejudice is not sufficient"); Monk v.
Packard, 71 Me. 309, 312 (1880) (distinguishing the emotional harm related to cemeteries from other harms
that were held to be nuisances because the asserted harm "must injuriously affect the senses or the nerves");
Devereux, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (opining that "[t]o restrain the conduct of a business not prohibited by statute at
the location in question, the inconvenience of adjoining owners must not be fanciful, or slight, but must be
certain and substantial, and must interfere with the physical comfort of the ordinarily reasonable person");
Young, 64 A.2d at 816 (agreeing that "[i]t may be... that all of us have a distaste for cemeteries, but it is a far
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the latter view, 139 but many later courts were willing to rely upon such
harms. 140 Besides this disagreement, there were several ways in which some
cemeteries and funeral homes were distinguished from others. Cemeteries and
funeral homes are only held to be a nuisance if they are found in a residential
area. 14 1 Also, where the neighbors cannot actually see the cemetery or the
mourners, it is less likely that a nuisance will be found.142
b. Facilitiesfor Those Perceivedas Dangerous
Several cases decided in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

held that a facility for those who had a contagious disease constituted a
nuisance when located in a residential neighborhood. 143 A more recent
Arkansas decision held that a halfway house for prisoners that was located in a
residential neighborhood constituted a nuisance.144 And an Arizona case held
that a church that served meals to indigent transients could be a nuisance. 145
cry from what is merely an annoyance ... to what the law regards and condemns as a nuisance"); Lynch,
supra note 123, at 353-54, 359 (describing the cases rejecting nuisance claims based on mental harms as
having "much the better foundation in legal theory").
139 See I WooD, supra note 5, at 7 (advising in 1893 that "[i]t
may be stated as a rule reasonably well
settled that neither a private nor public tomb, nor cemetery is a nuisance, unless" it results in contamination to
the water or the air).
140 See supra note 135.
141 As one court explained, "[tihe intrusion of a funeral home into an exclusively residential district would
ordinarily constitute a nuisance.... If, however, transition of the district from residential to business has so
far progressed that the value of surrounding property would be enhanced as business property, rather than
depreciated as residential property, the establishment of a funeral home would not constitute a nuisance."
Mitchell v. Bearden, 503 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Ark. 1974); see also Rutledge v. National Funeral Home Ass'n of
New Albany, Miss., 203 So. 2d 318, 320 (Miss. 1967) (reversing the trial court's refusal to enjoin the
establishment of a funeral home because the trial court failed to recognize that the neighborhood was
residential, not commercial).
142 See DeBorde v. St. Michael & All Angels Episcopal Church, 252 S.E.2d 876, 883 (S.C. 1979)
(emphasizing that the cemetery and the funeral processions will not be visible from most neighboring
properties).
143 See Stotler v. Rochelle, 109 P. 788, 790 (Kan. 1910) (holding that a hospital for cancer patients
constituted a nuisance); City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 39 A. 1081, 1082 (Md. 1898)
(deeming a house for "an unfortunate woman afflicted with leprosy" a nuisance); Barth v. Christian
Psychopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 163 N.W. 62, 64 (Mich. 1917) (determining that a proposed private insane asylum
would be a nuisance); Gilford v. Babies' Hosp., 1 N.Y.S. 448, 449 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888) (holding that a
proposed hospital for sick infants would constitute a nuisance); Cherry v. Williams, 61 S.E. 267, 270-71 (N.C.
1908) (holding that a hospital for tuberculosis patients constituted a nuisance); Everett v. Paschall, 111 P. 879,
879 (Wash. 1910) (holding that "a private sanitarium for the treatment and care of persons afflicted with
tuberculosis" was a nuisance).
144Arkansas Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 477 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Ark. 1972).
145See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 915-23 (Ariz.
1985) (indicating that the church's activities were a public nuisance that could be enjoined in an action brought
by a neighborhood association).
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The harms in each instance resulted from the fears of those living nearby.6
These fears prompted concerns about residents' physical health or safety.14
They led to worries about potential damage to property. 147 They also reduced
property values because others were less willing to locate in the neighborhood. 148 The fact that scientists questioned the possibility of any of these
harms actually occurring did not deter courts from accepting such fears as
sufficient for purposes of nuisance law. As one court explained, "The question
is, not whether the fear is founded in science,
49 but whether it exists; not whether
it is imaginary, but whether it is real". .. "1
The continuing viability of these cases is doubtful. A 1984 Louisiana
decision rejected similar concerns raised in opposition to a group home for five
individuals suffering from mental health illnesses. 150 Two courts have
expressed their disbelief-albeit in dicta-that the presence of a neighbor
infected with AIDS could be deemed a nuisance.1s 1 More commonly, issues
regarding the location of such group homes are resolved under local zoning
ordinances that seek to dictate where the facilities can be located. 152 Even
146

See Arkansas Release GuidanceFound., 477 S.W.2d at 822 (noting that "the real ... apprehension for

their safety by the nearby residents" resulted from "the inclusion of a sex offender as a resident" at a nearby
halfvay house); Stotler, 109 P. at 790 (indicating that the neighbors had reasonable ground to fear infection
from a nearby hospital for cancer patients); City of Baltimore, 39 A. at 1084-85 (describing the possibility that
the infection of a leprosy victim could spread to others); Barth, 163 N.W. at 63 (noting the allegation that
neighbors of an insane asylum would live in fear of infection and of physical assault if the inmates escaped);
Gilford, I N.Y.S. at 449 (suggesting that a hospital for sick infants "brings danger to the youthful members of
families living near"); Cherry, 61 S.E. at 270 (indicating that a hospital for tuberculosis patients "will be a
source of real danger to the lives and health of numbers of people living in that vicinity").
147 See Armory ParkNeighborhoodAss'n, 712 P.2d at 921 (indicating that indigents visiting church meal
service had defaced property in the neighborhood).
148 See Arkansas Release Guidance Found, 477 S.W.2d at 822 (acknowledging the decreased property
values associated with proximity to a halfway house); Stotler, 109 P. at 790 (noting that the presence of a
hospital for cancer patients would reduce property values); Barth, 163 N.W. at 63 (reciting the allegation that
proximity to an insane asylum would reduce property values).
149 Everett, Ill P. at 880. The court added that "Itihe theories and dogmas of scientific men, though
provable by scientific reference, cannot be held to be controlling unless shared by the people generally." Id. at
881.
150 See Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners Ass'n v. Manning, 459 So. 2d 1345, 1351-52 (La. App.
1984). The neighbors had claimed that they feared for the safety of their children and their quality of life if the
patients lived in the group home, but the court held that antidiscrimination norms and the absence of any
evidence of any actual incidents precluded the nuisance claim. See id.
151 See Mercer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (indicating that "public
policy disfavors compensation" where "a group home for the disabled moves into the neighborhood or when
someone when AIDS moves next door"); Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 726 (Mich. 1992).
152 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 145 (4th ed. 1997) (observing that "[m]ost municipalities

treat group homes for the handicapped as special exceptions and conditional uses, and group home owners
may also apply for zoning variances").

2001]

MORAL NUISANCES

then, federal antidiscrimination laws protecting the disabled have often
overridden local
land use decisions and allowed group homes to be sited where
53
they prefer. 1
But the application of such antidiscrimination norms to protect the siting of
facilities for the disabled does not necessarily establish that the fears expressed
by neighbors are outside the contours of modem nuisance law. The
Restatement even uses such an example as an illustration of the principle that
"fears and other mental reactions common to the community are to be taken
into account, even though they may be without scientific foundation or other
support in fact."' 154 In 1972, Arkansas Release Guidelines Foundation v.
Needler-one of the few decisions finding that such fears supported a finding
of a nuisance-raised the standard by insisting that there be substantial reasons
for the neighbor's fears. 155 But it remains uncertain whether any such fears
will still qualify as a nuisance.
c. EnvironmentalStigma
A more recent group of cases involves environmental pollution that cannot
reach the plaintiff's property, according to scientific experts. This occurs
when, for example, hazardous wastes leak into the groundwater, but an
impermeable barrier in the aquifer makes it hydrologically impossible for the
156
contamination to spread to the plaintiff's water supply or property.
Landowners have argued that they are injured by the stigma that attaches to
their property as a result of the nearby contamination. The nature of the injury
varies, but it often includes the resulting decline in property values. 157 Most
1S3 See, e.g., City of Edmunds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (holding that a city's refusal to
allow a group home for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts violated the federal Fair Housing Act).
154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821F cmt. f (1979). The example offered in the Restatement

explains that:
[The presence of a leprosy sanatarium in the vicinity of a group of private residences may
seriously interfere with the use and enjoyment of land because of the normal fear that it creates of
possible contagion, even though leprosy is in fact so rarely transmitted through normal contacts
that there is not practical possibility of communication of the disease.
Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 112, at 1333 n.23 (questioning a court's reliance upon the speculative and
intangible nature of the fears of a half-way house because "[a]tl fear is intangible, and uncertainty of harm is
also commonly the case with fear").
1-'477 S.W. 2d 821, 822 (Ark. 1972).
156 See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715,718 (Mich. 1992).
157See id. at 721 (indicating that "[t]he crux of the plaintiffs' complaint is that publicity concerning the
contamination of ground water in the area (although concededly not their ground water) caused diminution in
the value of the plaintiffs' property"); see also Alex Geisinger, Note, Nothing But Fear Itself.
A Social-
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courts have rejected the assertion that an environmental stigma alone provides
the requisite interference
for purposes of nuisance law,1 58 although com159
divided.
are
mentators
B. The Determinationof Which HarmsAre Actionable
The injuries considered in these lines of cases help to explain the current
validity of moral nuisance actions. The allegations in Mark v. Oregon State
Department of Fish and Wildlife illustrate how nuisance law can be used to
respond to an activity that a neighbor regards as immoral.16 In Mark, the
court identified several types of injuries that the presence of a nude beach on
the neighboring property could cause:
The harm to the plaintiffs is that their use of their property and their
social life have been restricted by their reluctance to expose
themselves, family, friends, and guests to public nudity and open
sexual activity, that they are fearful for their safety due to their
proximity to the nude beach activities, that they are embarrassed,
offended and angered by coming in contact with nude adult behavior,
that their right to go for a walk and enjoy the public beaches adjacent
to their home has been restricted by harassment from nude
sunbathers, and161that those things have greatly diminished the value of
their property.

Psychological Model of Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications; 76 NEB. L. REV. 452, 475-96 (1997)
(distinguishing the different kinds of environmental stigmas).
158 See Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 981, 986 (D. Wyo. 1998) (rejecting an environmental

stigma claim against an oil refinery and tank farm, and citing several additional cases holding that
environmental stigma alone does not support a cause of action); Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy System, Inc.,
835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (rejecting an environmental stigma claim against a nearby uranium
processing plant); Adkins, 487 N.W.2d at 717 (holding five votes to two that landowners cannot bring a
nuisance action based solely on the stigma of nearby environmental contamination). But see Exxon Corp. v.
Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1001-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (permitting a landowner to bring a nuisance action

against leaking underground gasoline storage tanks even though no contamination had reached his property),
DeSario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a nuisance

action based on environmental stigma alone).
159 Compare Michael D. Riseberg, Note, Exhuming the Funeral Home Cases: Proposing a Private
Nuisance Action Based on the MentalAnguish Caused by Pollution, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. RaV. 557,

583-86 (1994) (analogizing to the funeral home and prostitution cases to support a nuisance claim for
environmental stigma injuries), with E. Jean Johnson, Environmental Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages

in Environmental Tort Cases, 15 UCLA J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 185 (1996/97) (arguing against recovery for
environmental stigma).
160 974 P.2d 716,718 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).

161 Id. at 718; see also Appellants' Opening Brief and Abstract of Record at A-I-A-4, Mark v. Oregon
State Dep't of Fish and wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (No. CA-A97006) (recounting the
allegations of harm in more graphic detail).
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By contrast, the plaintiffs did not contend that their mere awareness of the
activities on the nude beach supported a nuisance claim, or that a nuisance
existed because those activities wrongfully induced them to engage in
improper activities.
A closer examination of the injuries alleged in Mark and the early cases
reveals that some moral injuries may serve as the basis for a nuisance claim,
while others may not. In particular, a moral nuisance can be premised on the
sight of the offensive activity, the inability to use the property because of the
embarrassment caused by the activity, reasonable fears, or any more general
interferences-such as excessive noises or physical harassment-with the
plaintiff's use of his or her property. The mere awareness of the activity, any
improper temptation produced by the activity, and reduced property values are
not sufficient to establish a nuisance.
1. Awareness
The simple awareness that a neighbor is engaged in activities that one
regards as immoral does not support a nuisance claim. There is undoubtedly a
sense in which one can be bothered by the knowledge that your neighbor is
living with an unmarried partner, rooting for the Mets, or voting for Ralph
Nader. But any offense that one takes from that knowledge is not actionable.
As Richard Epstein explains, "the abstract sense of being offended that certain
activities are being conducted in one's own neighborhood" is "generally given
little weight. '' 162 Indeed, the very idea of such a claim is offensive. But these
claims are rarely made: for example, the plaintiffs in Mark did not rely upon
their mere awareness of the nude beach next door. 163 When they are raised,
such claims are promptly rejected. For example, in 1883, Justice Brewer wrote
for the Kansas Supreme Court that the presence of an African-American family
living on neighboring property does not constitute a nuisance. 164 The only
contrary precedent is a 1915 Kentucky decision holding that the fact that an
165
unmarried couple was cohabiting next door constituted a public nuisance.
That is the only case, and it has never been followed.
162 EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 357.

163 974 P.2d at 717-18.
164 Faloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 297 (1883) (asserting that "equity will not interfere simply because
the occupants of such house are by reason of race, color, or habits, disagreeable or offensive"). I discuss
Justice Brewer's views in more detail text accompanying infra notes 280-85.
165 Adams v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W. 1006, 1006 (Ky. 1915) (sustaining a public nuisance conviction
based on an indictment stating that the man and woman "though not husband and wife, did for several months,
and within a year before the finding of the indictment, unlawfully cohabit and live together in adulterous
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2. Moral Temptations
Public nuisance law long sought to protect the public morals. The injury to
be prevented in such instances is the spread of immoral activities caused by the
temptation to engage in them. 166 But general concerns about public morals
cannot serve as an injury that permits private individuals to bring a nuisance
suit because such concerns lie within the exclusive province of the
government. As Prosser has explained, an individual cannot bring a nuisance
action simply because he or she fears being led into sin. 167 So it is not
surprising that Mark and Powers declined to assert that the presence of the
nude beach could somehow improperly influence their own conduct.
3. Offensive Sights
The annoyance or offense that one experiences from seeing objectionable
conduct serves as a cognizable injury in nuisance cases, albeit a controversial
one. The nineteenth century moral nuisance cases indicated that the sight of
prostitution, gambling, or drinking supported a nuisance claim. 168 Several
169
other cases held that the sight of breeding horses constituted a nuisance.
Countless cases confirm that lights, sounds, and odors that do not present any
documented health effects nonetheless can qualify as nuisances if they are
sufficiently annoying to neighboring landowners. 170 The results in the
relations in a certain house in the town Of Mt. Vernon by sleeping in and occupying the same room and bed in
the house and 'acting in a lewd and vulgar manner, to the common public nuisance and scandal, and to the
detriment of good morals and religion and to those persons then and there residing in the neighborhood and
passing and repassing, and having a right to pass and reside' therein").
166 See, e.g., Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 494 (1897) (reciting the defendant's argument that the
sale of lottery tickets was "injurious to public morals by tempting the people into the immoral habit of
gaming"); Hickey v. State, 53 Ala. 514, 517 (1875) (upholding a public nuisance conviction for operating a
disorderly house because "the common injury flows from the evil influence it exerts-from the temptations
and opportunities for the commission of crime it affords").
167 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 652 (insisting that "it cannot be a tort to a person simply
because that person was induced to engage in immoral or sinful conduct").
168 See supratext accompanying Dotes 44-69.
169 See Williams v. Wolfgang, 132 N.W. 30,31 (Iowa 1911) (acknowledging "[t]he shock to the sense of
decency and the annoyance which must result to residents from the fact of breeding stallions to mares in the
immediate vicinity"); Hayden v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214, 224 (1866) (enjoining the breeding of horses near the
plaintiff's home because "social happiness is marred by a disgusting annoyance perpetually bringing the blush
of shame to modesty and innocence"); Farrell v. Cook, 20 N.W. 720 (Neb. 1884) (holding that the breeding of
horses "in full view" of the plaintiffs home constituted a nuisance); Nolin v. Mayor & Aldermen of Franklin,
12 Tenn. 163 (1833) (concluding that "showing and keeping a stud horse" in town constituted a nuisance); see
also RESTATEMENT (TORTs) SECOND § 829 cmt d, illus. 2 (1979) (agreeing that the embarrassment of
watching breeding livestock is the basis for a nuisance).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.
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aesthetic nuisance cases have been more mixed, but there is an increasing trend
toward finding that unsightly activities qualify as nuisances.171
The sight of public nudity or public sexual activity causes similar offense
for many people. The plaintiffs in Mark insisted that they were "embarrassed,
172
offended and angered by coming into contact with nude adult behavior."
The court characterized their further claim of "[u]ndesired exposure to sexual
activity" as "one of the traditional grounds for finding either a public or a
private nuisance." 173 The exposure of children to such sights is especially
troubling. 174 In each instance, the sight is actionable because it offends and
annoys those who are exposed to it. Sights, moreover, are different in kind
from mere awareness. The effects of such visual experience are far more
striking than a more generalized knowledge of an activity. This is confirmed
by the remedy sought by the plaintiffs in Mark: to remove
the activities from
175
their view, not to eliminate those activities altogether.
4. Embarrassment
Sights can also support a nuisance claim when they are embarrassing.
Mark and Powers contended that they could not use their property because
they were unwilling to expose themselves or others to the neighboring nude
beach. 176 This interference with their use of their property is the very essence
of the kinds of injury targeted by private nuisance law. But the interference
seems different from the typical nuisance claims against environmental
contamination that poisons a well or loud noises that prevent sleep because it
depends upon the reaction of the plaintiffs. The inability to entertain guests
171 See supra text accompanying notes 133-41.
172 974P.2dat718.
173 Id. at 719.

174 See Mark Appellants' Brief, supra note 161, at 15 (stating that "family members and friends,
particularly those with children, are uncomfortable and unwilling to visit plaintiffs' home for fear of run ins
with nude adults"); David Callender, Jensen: GOP Wants to Shut Nude Beach; Calls Mazo Sunbathers Bad
Influence on Kids, THE CAPrrL TIMIES (Madison, Wis.), July 28, 1999, at 2A (quoting a state legislator who
supported a bill to prohibit nude sunbathing in all state parks and recreational areas because "[w]e're not
prudes, but 4-year-old kids should not be seeing adults parading around naked at a state park... ?').
But see
John Ritter, ForSome Cities, Going Nude Is Rude, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1999, at 3A (reporting that naturists
are challenging a county law prohibiting parents from taking their children to clothing-optional areas).
175See Appellants' Reply Brief and Abstract Record at 15, Mark v. Oregon State Dep't of Fish and
Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (No. CA-A97006) (insisting that "plaintiffs have never alleged that
a complete ban on nudity in the wildlife area was the only way to prevent the nuisance.... All plaintiffs ever
requested was that the defendants contain the nude activities somewhere out of view from their residence or
from the road leading to their residence.").
176 Mark, 974 P.2d at 718.
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because of the embarrassment that attends the sight of a nearby activity is only
rarely cited as a harm in nuisance cases. 17 7 Further, the users of the nude beach
would likely contend that any neighbors remained able to use their property,
and their unwillingness to do so is their own fault.
That argument should fail whenever the plaintiffs act reasonably in not
wanting to expose themselves or their guests to public nudity. The inquiry
should focus on the interference with the use of the land, not the source of that
interference. The requirement that the reaction be reasonable follows from the
emphasis on community standards and the hypersensitive plaintiff doctrine
discussed below, 178 and it ensures that the interference is real rather than
imaginary.
5. Fears

Mark and Powers argued that they had been harassed by nude sunbathers
and that they feared for their safety. 179 These fears will support a nuisance
claim if they are reasonable, and perhaps even if they are not. Fears for
IS
personal health form the basis for most environmental nuisance claims. O
Fears for personal safety have been raised in the old cases involving houses of
prostitution and the more recent cases involving the citing of facilities for the
sick and for released convicts.1 81 Fears of death divided the courts in the
cemetery and funeral home cases. 182 All of these cases honor fears that are
deemed reasonable, though other factors might preclude a finding of a
nuisance. Unreasonable fears are more troubling. While some opinions
183
suggest that a fear can be actionable even if it lacks any evidentiary support,
the better view would restrict a neighbor's activities only if the fear that it
provokes can be shown to be reasonable.

177 See Brown v. Arbuckle, 198 P.2d 550, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948), 198 P.2d at 551 (describing "the
dampening effect" that a proposed funeral home would have on the use of the plaintiffs backyard for picnics
and parties); Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 188-91 (Va. 1982) (upholding an aesthetic nuisance claim where
a landowner asserted that the view of wrecked cars on a neighbor's lot made him self-conscious and unwilling
to invite friends over for cookouts).
178 See infra text accompanying notes 211-23.
179 Mark, 974 P.2d at 718; see also Nelson, Island's Nude Sunbathers Pose Nuisanceand Threat, supra
note 18, at CI (reporting that Powers testified at trial that nude sunbathers have "threatened to burn down her
house" and "warned her that they are 'organized and militant').
180 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 77-89, 165-71.
182 See supratext accompanying notes 146-64.
183 See supra text accompanying note 171.
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6. Loss of Property Value
A loss of property value alone cannot justify a nuisance claim. Wood's
nineteenth century treatise asserted that impacts on property value are
insufficient to establish a nuisance. 184 This principle has endured as one of the
few fixed rules in nuisance law. Some of the contrary suggestions, though,
occurred in the early moral nuisance cases.1 5 More recently, the argument
that an activity that decreases the value of the plaintiff's property has been
raised in the environmental stigma cases, but most courts have rejected such
claims. 186 The traditional rule is best because there is no limit to the kind of
neighboring activities that can be vilified as a cause of declining property
values. But if courts come to accept the assertions of most commentators that
a loss in property value is a sufficient injury for nuisance purposes when
environmental contamination is at issue, then a loss in property value should
also be sufficient when moral injuries are at issue.
C. The Application of Community Moral Norms
The fact that someone is embarrassed, offended, afraid, or annoyed by what
they regard as their neighbor's immoral conduct does not necessarily make that
conduct a nuisance. The law of nuisance has not, does not, and should not
recognize every moral objection as the basis for a claim, even if those
objections are associated with the kinds of injuries that nuisance law is
designed to prevent. A moral objection must be commonly held in the
community before the harms that it causes can give rise to a nuisance claim.
The characterization of an activity as a moral nuisance depends on how that
activity is viewed in the community in which it occurs. The Restatement states
the general principle that "[t]he location, character and habits of the particular
community are to be taken into account in determining what is offensive or
'187 Likewise, Professor Ellickson
annoying to a normal individual living init."
184 See I WOOD, supra note 5, at 4-5; accordMichael D. Riseberg, Exhuming the FuneralHome Cases:
Proposinga PrivateNuisanceAction Basedon the MentalAnguish CausedBy Pollution,21 ENVrL. AFF. 557,
566 (1994) (stating that "the courts have long recognized that a depreciation in property value, without other
harm, does not constitute an actionable interference with the use and enjoyment of property').
185See, e.g., Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128, 143-48 (Md. 1857) (sustaining a court's jurisdiction to
entertain a nuisance claim against a "bawdy-house" alleged to have lessened the value of the plaintiffs
property); Blagen v. Smith, 56 P. 292, 295 (Or. 1999) (indicating that a loss in property value attributable to
proximity to a house of prostitution could support a nuisance action seeking damages but not an injunction).
186 See supra text accompanying note 181.
187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS

§ 821F cmt. e (1979).
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characterizes a nuisance as an activity that is "perceived as unneighborly under
contemporary community standards. ' 188 This reference to community
standards also echoes the current test for obscenity, which relies upon the
standards of particular communities to determine whether
189 material is obscene
and thus outside the protection of the first amendment.
Conversely, nuisance law does not protect the delicate. Once again,
Oregon is the source of the leading case stating the hypersensitivity doctrine.
In Amphitheaters, Inc. v. PortlandMeadows, a horse racetrack and a drive-in
190
movie theater were built at nearly the same time on neighboring properties.
The lights necessary to accommodate nighttime horse racing made it nearly
impossible to view the movies next door. The court rejected the theater's
nuisance claim, however, because the lights caused harm only because of the
unusual sensitivity of the theater. 191 Other cases follow the same principle.
Courts have characterized opposition to cemeteries as based on the unusual
as offensive to
sensitivity of the neighbors, while
192 saloons were once described
more than just sensitive people.
So those who possess unusual moral sensibilities cannot rely upon a
nuisance action to protect them. The sights, embarrassment, and fear that arise
from moral objections to an activity should be actionable only where there is a
consensus that the offending activity is immoral and objectionable. Different
communities have different norms of morality. Material that is regarded as
obscene in one city may be accepted in another. 193 As Prosser once remarked
about nuisance law generally, "What is a nuisance in Palm Springs is not
necessarily one in Pittsburgh."194 Moral sensibilities, moreover, are changing.
18

Ellickson, supra note 19, at 748; accord PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 19, at 627 (noting that "[i]t

has been said that the standard for the determination of significant and unreasonable is the standard of normal
persons in a particular locality"); Coletta, supra note 114, at 161 (stating that "[t]he average person with
ordinary sensibilities is a suitable standard against which to measure aesthetic interferences").
189 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (explaining the "contemporary community standards" test
for obscenity).
19o See Amphitheaters, 198 P.2d 847, 848-50 (Or. 1948). Ellickson discusses Amphitheaters and cites
several other hyper-extrasensitivity cases that were described by Ronald H. Coase in The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcON. 1 (1960). See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 753-54 & n.244.
191 See Amphitheaters, 198 P.2d at 857-58.
192 Compare Young v. St. Martin's Church, 64 A.2d 814, 816-17 (Pa. 1949) (indicating that plaintiffs
objecting to cemeteries are sensitive), with Haggart v. Stehlin, 35 N.E. 997, 1000 (Ind. 1893) (holding that a
saloon is not offensive only to the delicate).
193 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 (stating that "[it is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City").
194 PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 19, at 633.
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The presence of a hate group or abortion protestors on a neighbor's land is
more likely to elicit a moral objection today than a billiard hall or a disorderly
house. Moreover, nuisance law requires more than a common belief that an
activity is immoral. The community might regard an activity as immoral, but
be willing to tolerate those who believe otherwise. A moral nuisance exists
only if an activity that most members of the community find immoral actually
interferes with their use and enjoyment of their land.
Public nudity offers a useful example. The activities that troubled the
plaintiffs in Mark would be accepted without incident in those parts of the
world where nude beaches are commonplace. 195 Attitudes toward nude
beaches are divided in other places. 196 But most communities hold to the
traditional discomfort with nude beaches. 197 The Mark Court sided with the
latter view, concluding that the plaintiffs could not be dismissed 198as
oversensitive for objecting to public nudity, let alone public sexual activity.
The application of these standard nuisance rules still leaves the question of
why a landowner should be able to regulate a neighbor's activities based on a
contested vision of morality. In one sense, this raises the far broader question
of the ability of the law to regulate morality at all, an issue that is well beyond
the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the law routinely, albeit
sometimes controversially, still regulates conduct simply because the
community regards it as immoral. 199 In another sense, though, the focus on
morality overlooks the fact that the kinds of harm are not unique to moral
195 See, e.g., United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 118 (4th Cir. 1991) (Mumaghan, J., concurring)
(noting that the French do not object to nude beaches).
196 See Naturist Education Foundation, NEF/RoperPoll2000: American Attitudes on Skinny-Dipping and
Nude Sunbathing (visited April 3, 2000) <http://nef.oshkosh.net/Projects/NEF-Roper..Poll/nef-roper..poll.
html> (reporting the results of a poll indicating that Americans are evenly divided regarding whether "special
and secluded areas should be set aside for people who enjoy nude sunbathing"). That poll also indicated much
greater support for allowing nude sunbathing "at a beach that is accepted for that purpose." Id.
19' See Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115-16 (explaining that "[t]he important governmental interest [in prohibiting
public nudity] is the widely recognized one of protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of
society that still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow
citizens' anatomies that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones"); State v. Rocker,
475 P.2d 684, 689 (Haw. 1970) (referring to the "unreasonable belief' of nude sunbathers "that their acts
under the circumstances of this case were not likely to offend members of the general public").
13 974 P.2d 716, 720 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "[alithough the question is the effect of the
challenged activity on an ordinary person, and although the law does not protect the delicate, plaintiff's
allegations would allow finding that the nudity constituted a nuisance") (citation omitted).
19) See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward OptimalEnvironmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495, 1527
n.101 (1999) (observing that "[miany of the environmental laws of the United States, developed in the 1970s
and early 1980s, are built on the premise that pollution is immoral and should be entirely stopped").
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nuisances. One could equally question why nuisance law provides a remedy
where noises, lights, odors, or other physical phenomena provoke a dispute
between neighbors. But that simply returns the issue to the kind of injury that
the landowner suffers. And, as we have seen, moral nuisances include harms
that nuisance law has always recognized.

III. THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S AcrrvrrY
The harm suffered by the plaintiff is only half of the problem in nuisance
cases. Even where the plaintiff has experienced a cognizable harm, a nuisance
exists only if the defendant's activity lacks legal protection and sufficient
social utility in the place in which it occurs. Moral nuisances raise difficult
questions in both instances because of the increasingly contested nature of
many moral claims and of any legal regulation based on such claims. But,
there are answers to many of those questions. A moral nuisance claim should
be available when the defendant's activity is unprotected by the lawespecially when it is prohibited by the law-and when that activity possesses
less value in the community in which it occurs than the harms associated with
the moral concerns.
A. The Legality of the Defendant'sActivity
The law can take four alternative approaches to a defendant's conduct. It
can protect it via a constitutional provision. It can seemingly permit it through
a zoning or licensing scheme. It can make it illegal. Or it can say nothing at
all. These different approaches yield distinct results for moral nuisance claims.
1. ConstitutionalProtections
Nuisance law cannot prohibit what the Constitution protects. 200 This
obvious principle explains why the regulation of certain activities that were
once banned as nuisances, such as theaters showing pornographic movies, is
now governed by intricate constitutional rules. Moreover, just as norms of
morality are contested, the boundaries of constitutional restrictions on the legal
regulation of immoral activities are similarly imprecise.

200 But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (indicating that the
protective scope of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause depends on whether an activity constitutes a
traditional common law nuisance).
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In this climate, a nuisance action against any activity based on notions of
morality is sure to prompt a constitutional objection. Consider State ex rel.
Montgomery v. Pakrats Motorcycle Club, Inc., in which the sponsors of an
annual outdoor party featuring public nudity and public sex argued that such
The sponsors cited Schad
conduct was protected by the First Amendment.
v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim to support their claim that a "titty contest" was
expressive conduct and thus immune from state regulation under the First
Amendment. 2 02 Schad invalidated a local zoning ordinance that banned adult
theaters from any location in the community. 2° 3 The Ohio Court of Appeals
distinguished Schad because "[w]hile some contestants did dance on stage,
expressive dancing was clearly not the primary focus of the contest.
Furthermore, even if the 'titty contest' were protected by the First Amendment,
'2°4
many other public sexual acts engaged in by party attendees were not.
That some would invoke the Constitution's protections for conduct as
offensive as that involved in Pakrats Motorcycle Club shows that the mere
invocation of a constitutional problem should not stifle a moral nuisance claim.
Thus the allegations of public sexual activity in Mark will not be blocked by
any constitutional protections. Nor is it likely that the Constitution would
forbid a nuisance action against a nude beach, even without the sexual activity.
An eclectic array of constitutional objections have been leveled against
government prohibitions on nude beaches: claims of First Amendment
expressive rights, equal protection objections to the failure to treat the bodies
205
of women and men identically, privacy, and rights of assorted provenances.
With few exceptions, such arguments have failed.
693 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
202 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
203 id.
201

204 PakratsMotorcycle Club, 693 N.E.2d at 313.
2o' See United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an Equal Protection claim
and a Ninth Amendment claim against a conviction for going topless on the beach at the Chincoteague
National Wildlife Refuge); South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608,610(1lth Cir. 1984)
(rejecting a First Amendment claim); Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1173-75 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (rejecting freedom of expression, right to privacy, and freedom of association claims against the
regulation of a nude beach); McGuire v. State, 489 So. 2d 729, 730-31 (Fla. 1986) (rejecting a First
Amendment claim); State v. Miller, 501 P.2d 363, 366 (Haw. 1972) (same); State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684,
689-90 (Haw. 1970) (rejecting right to privacy claims); People v. Hollman, 500 N.E.2d 297,300,302-03 (N.Y.
1986) (rejecting First Amendment and liberty claims). But see Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 127
(D. Mass. 1975) (finding a constitutional right to nude sunbathing on a secluded beach that was traditionally
held out as a nude beach); People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 233-34 (N.Y. 1992) (sustaining an equal
protection challenge that prohibited only women from going topless); People v. David, 585 N.Y.S.2d 149,
150-51 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1991) (same); Richard B. Kellam & Ted Scott Lovelace, To Bare or Not to Bear: The
Constitutionalityof Local OrdinancesBanning Nude Sunbathing, 20 U. RIcm. L. RaV. 589, 598-620 (1986)
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All of those cases were decided before the Supreme Court revisited the
constitutionality of laws restricting public nudity in City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M. 206 There the Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting public nudity
could constitutionally be applied to nude erotic dancing at a nightclub.2 °7 The
crime and other secondary effects that Erie determined were associated with
20S
nude dancing provided the requisite government interest to sustain the law.
And while the constitutionality of applying the public nudity ordinance to nude
dancing divided the Court, none of the Justices suggested that public nudity
that lacks an expressive component is entitled to constitutional protection.20 9
The constitutional argument against government prohibitions on nude beaches
becomes far more difficult since Erie.
But the argument for moral nuisances does not depend on the correctness
of Erie or the decisions holding that nude beaches are not constitutionally
protected. The point is that some conduct which many regard as immoral is
beyond the scope of the Constitution's protections. Outside of the Constitution's boundaries-wherever they are-the state possesses police power to
regulate for the protection of the public morals, just as it protects the public
health. So, too, may nuisance actions proceed against the cognizable harms

(article co-authored by a federal judge summarizing and taking a generally more favorable attitude toward the
constitutional arguments against the regulation of nude beaches); Ryan Konotopsky, Jacob et al. v. The
Community Standard of Tolerance: Substantive Equality, Indecency, and Topless Rightsfor Women, 63 SASK.
L. REV. 215, 216 (2000) (insisting that "there is no justifiable reason to draw the line of nudity and indecency
at the waist for men, and not women" under Canadian law). The cases have also included constitutional
vagueness and overbreadth challenges against particular ordinances regulating nudity on public beaches, but I
need not discuss those issues here because the constitutionality of certain statutory bans on nude beaches does
not affect the availability of the common law nuisance claim.
206 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).
207 Id. at 1384-98.

208 Id. at 1393-94. The crime, property value, and quality of life effects are denominated "secondary" to
contrast them with the primary effects associated with the content of the speech itself. See DANIEL A. FARBER,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1998) (explaining that "[p]resumably, a secondary effect is a kind of side-effect
of speech that happens to be associated with particular types of content, but which could in principle derive
from other forms of speech," whereas "the fact that a message offends its audience is not a secondary effect").
Justice Stevens objected that the Court had never before relied upon secondary effects to uphold a complete
ban on a type of speech, as opposed to a restriction on the location of that speech. City of Erie, 120 S. Ct. at
1406 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The future evaluation of secondary effects could influence the viability of
moral nuisance claims because the harms alleged in such cases can include both primary effects (e.g.,
opposition to prostitution) and secondary effects (e.g., traffic and noise).
209 See City of Erie, 120 S. Ct. at 1391 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[B]eing 'in a state of nudity' is
not an inherently expressive condition."); id. at 1401 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Erie had
recently been having a public nudity problem not with streakers, sunbathers or hot-dog vendors, but with lap
dancers.") (citation omitted).
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suffered by those living adjacent to conduct that the community regards as
immoral.
2. GovernmentalAcceptance of the PermittedActivity
The absence of any constitutional protection for a contested activity does
not necessarily establish the propriety of nuisance actions brought by private
individuals. Conduct that neighbors may regard as a nuisance often is allowed
either explicitly or implicitly by zoning laws, licensing schemes, and other
state and local statutes.
Most contemporary land use determinations are made as a function of
zoning laws. Municipal zoning ordinances have become ubiquitous in the
United States since the time that the heyday of the judicial decisions involving
moral nuisance claims.
Zoning law enables courts to make a more
comprehensive determination of whether land uses are appropriate considering
the overall perspective of the entire community. Zoning is also the result of
decisions made by legislators and administrators who are more likely to be
chosen through the representative process than the judges who decide nuisance
cases. 21 Thus, zoning has assumed the role of addressing land uses that raise
moral concerns for many individuals, such as bookstores
selling pornographic
magazines and theaters showing pornographic movies. 211
As a formal matter, zoning, licensing, and other apparent methods of
approval have long failed to defeat nuisance claims. The fact that municipal
zoning does not prohibit a use does not preempt or otherwise forbid a nuisance
212
action against that use.
For example, most courts have concluded that a
funeral home can be a nuisance, even if it is located in an area zoned for such
businesses. 213 Nor does the granting of a specific license to a particular

210 Actually, the prevalence of elected state judges makes the difference here smaller than one might
initially expect. See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficult,: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHi. L. REv. 689, 725-26 (1995) (reporting that 23 states use elections to select judges, 12 use
appointments, and the balance employ some combination of the two procedures).
211 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance
regulating the location of adult bookstores); Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 844 (2001) (invalidating an adult business municipal zoning ordinance).
212 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 633 (reporting that "[m]ost courts hold that zoning
ordinances do not protect the defendant from a claim by a particular plaintiff that the defendant's use is an
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment by the plaintiff of his property and, therefore, a private
nuisance").
213 See supratext accompanying notes 157-63.
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activity necessarily protect that activity from a nuisance suit.2 14 More
generally, the failure to regulate certain conduct, when other related conduct is
regulated does not preclude a nuisance suit. The Oregon statute applicable in
Mark provided that public nudity was illegal only if "it occur[ed] with the
intent of arousing the sexual desire of either the actor or another person. 2 15
Even assuming that the conduct occurring on the nude beach did not violate
that statute, the court stated that "an activity that is otherwise legal may still
,216
Still, the courts are hesitant to fmd that an activity
constitute a nuisance."

constitutes a nuisance if it is authorized by statute
2 17 or if there is a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the activity.
Such judicial acceptance of nuisance actions notwithstanding legislative or
administrative approval of an activity does not resolve the question of relative
institutional competence. This is perhaps especially true with regard to moral
nuisances, which involve activities whose locations typically now are
addressed through zoning law. Today the bars, gambling casinos, and adult
theaters that were the focus of much early nuisance jurisprudence are now
regulated by local zoning and licensing decisions. By contrast, Professor
Ellickson captured the prevailing view when he observed that "nuisance law2is
18
widely viewed as an archaic means of handling land use problems."
Professor Epstein explains that zoning law displaced common law nuisance

214 See, e.g., Farmer v. Bellmer, 100 P. 901, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909) (agreeing that a house of
prostitution constituted a nuisance even though "[tihe trustees of the city put their moral consciousness to
sleep" by licensing it); Haggart v. Stehlins, 35 N.E. 997, 1000-01 (Ind. 1893) (holding that a saloon was a
nuisance despite being licensed); Koehl v. Schoenhausen, 17 So. 809, 810-11 (La. 1895) (same); Givens v.
Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 156-57 (1885) (holding that a house of prostitution was a nuisance even though it
had been licensed). See also generally Note, The Halfway House as Private Nuisance, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q.
811, 812 (1972) (citing a case holding that a license or other authorization does not bar a nuisance action).
215 974 P.2d 716,720 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 163.465 (1990)).
216 Id. The court explained that a contrary rule would have eliminated the need for statutes barring
nuisance claims against farming activities on land zoned for farming. See id.
217 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 821B cmt. f (1979) (describing the effect of compliance with
statutes and consistency with zoning laws as a factor in determining whether an activity constitutes a
nuisance); Note, supra note 216, at 812-13 (citing two cases that indicate that legislative authorization
establishes a higher standard of proof in nuisance actions).
218 Ellickson, supra note 19, at 720; see also Halper, supra note 6, at 91 (writing that "[once the only
means of adjusting landuse conflicts; nuisance.., had virtually disappeared from that role by the first quarter
of this century, supplanted by tools more suited to large-scale solutions"). Professor Ellickson would not rely
upon traditional common law nuisance adjudication even though he is a critic of zoning and prefers private
means of resolving land use disputes. See Ellickson, supra at 706-11, 762. Instead, he advocates special
administrative "nuisance boards" that would apply common law nuisance principles to competing land uses,
rather than relying upon the courts. Id. at 762-71 (describing the proposed structure and hypothetical examples
of the functions of nuisance boards).
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actions because of "the uncertain and collective nature of the harms" involved
in moral nuisances. 9
This is my greatest concern about moral nuisance actions. It is troubling
for courts to override the decisions of legislators or executive officials to
permit an activity that should not be permitted. But the institutional concerns
are no more troubling in the context of moral nuisances than they are for other
kinds of nuisances.
A sweeping assertion that only legislative and
administrative officials can properly adjudge conflicting land uses would
eliminate nuisance law altogether, and that has not occurred. Nuisance law
continues to play a role in resolving land use disputes that is modest in scope,
but critical as an alternative to exclusive reliance upon governmental action.
Environmental nuisance claims continue to be litigated precisely because those
individuals who are threatened by contamination are dissatisfied with public
environmental enforcement efforts. Nuisance law, in short, serves as a backup to more common land use procedures, especially zoning. Nuisance law
should be more deferential to explicit legislative land use decisions that
presumptively reflect the community's judgment. It remains important,
though, to provide direct legal remedies to injured landowners.
3. Illegality of the Defendant'sActivity
Nuisance actions facilitate, rather than frustrate, state and local laws when
the contested activity is illegal. Public nuisances were crimes according to the
traditional common law, and today many statutes proscribe certain kinds of
criminal conduct deemed to be public nuisances. 22 Private individuals who
are concerned about such illegal activities often seek governmental assistance
in ridding their neighborhoods of public nuisances. That assistance is the only
option for private individuals seeking a criminal prosecution for a public
nuisance, because private individuals cannot bring their own criminal actions
against those engaged in the offending conduct. The value of nuisance actions
available to private parties is that they serve as an alternative mechanism to
oppose illegal activities that the authorities are unwilling or unable to stop.
Private individuals can seek the different remedies of injunctive relief or
219 EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 357; see also Halper, supra note 6, at 91 (asserting that "nuisance, with its
confusions, contingencies and lack of principle, had virtually disappeared from that role in the first quarter of
this century, supplanted by tools more suited to large-scale solutions").
220 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 645 (explaining that "la]t common law, a public
nuisance was always a crime, and punishable as such. In the United States, all jurisdictions have enacted
broad criminal statutes covering such nuisances .... ") (footnote omitted).
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damages in two instances: either where the defendant is engaged in a private
nuisance, or where the defendant is engaged in a public nuisance, and the
private plaintiff has suffered a special injury unlike that experienced by the
221
public more generally.
Of course, those choices are available regardless of the legality of the
defendant's conduct. The special relevance of a legal prohibition against the
defendant's conduct is that it increases the likelihood that the conduct will be
regarded as a nuisance-private or public. This enables concerned individuals
to rely on governmental enforcement action or bring their own legal action
against the defendant. Not surprisingly, the first option appears preferable.
Most activities that are objectionable to the residents of a community are
addressed by governmental authorities via public nuisance law or other legal
prohibitions. Often, the government acts at the specific request of concerned
neighbors. The value of nuisance actions available to private parties, then, is
an alternative mechanism to oppose illegal activities that the authorities are
unwilling or unable to stop.
This dynamic is illustrated by the approach that the law takes to activities
that can be regarded as moral nuisances. For example, statutes prohibiting the
222
use of property for prostitution are typically enforced by local officials;
nuisance law enables local residents to object to houses of prostitution as
well.2 2 3 Likewise, nude beaches have faced charges of illegality as well as
Many state statutes and local ordinances contain general
immorality.
prohibitions against public nudity and public sexual activity. 224 Other statutes
225
These statutes are often at the behest of
specifically target nude beaches.

221 See supra text accompanying note 58.
222 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11,225 (vest 2000) (prohibiting the use of property for prostitution);
State v. Rowan, 859 P.2d 737, 737 (Ariz. 1993) (sustaining a conviction for running a house of prostitution in
violation of ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3208(B) (1989)).
223 See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.

224 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1403 (2000) (prohibiting "public sexual indecency"); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 5.2084(8) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (providing that "[wihether or not so provided in its charter, a city may,
by ordinance, regulate or prohibit public nudity within city boundaries").
225 See, e.g., South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting
a Miami ordinance that makes it unlawful for anyone to "bathe, wash, or swim in any river, lake, pond or pool
within the city, naked or insufficiently clothed to prevent improper exposure of his person"); United States v.
Hymans, 463 F.2d 615, 616 (10th Cir. 1972) (describing posted signs prohibiting "public nudity" near a river
in a national forest); Kellam & Lovelace, supra note 205, at 592-93 n.6 (quoting a Virginia Beach ordinance
that makes it unlawful "for any person not wearing a bathing suit or other clothing to bathe in any lake, pond
or in the Atlantic Ocean or Chesapeake Bay within the City").
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neighbors who complain to local officials. 2 26 But the government often
declines to enforce such laws. As one official put it, "'[w]e've got higher
enforcement" than enforcing public nudity ordinances on
priorities in law 227
state-run beaches.

A nuisance action provides concerned neighbors with a direct means of
combating activities that they regard as immoral, and that the law treats as
illegal. In this respect, private nuisance claims are analogous to citizen suits in
environmental law. Such citizen suits empower any injured private individual
or organization to sue anyone who has violated the substantive provisions of

the environmental statute. 22 8 Even if the government makes a purposeful
decision not to pursue a polluter, any injured parties can bring suit and obtain
injunctive relief against the polluter or penalties to be paid to the federal
treasury. 229 These private citizen suits achieve several purposes. They
supplement the enforcement capabilities of governmental agencies faced with
226 See Collins v. State, 288 S.E.2d 43, 44 (Ga. CL App. 1981) (describing a tvelve-year-old girl who
called her parents at work when she saw a neighbor "sunbathing in the nude on his back porch wearing only
white socks and black shoes"); State v. Miller, 501 P.2d 363, 365 (Haw. 1972) (indicating that the police
visited a beach looking for nude sunbathers in response to a report from a local citizen); State v. Rocker, 475
P.2d 684, 686 (Haw. 1970) (noting that the Maui Police Department received a phone call about nude
sunbathers from an anonymous person); People v. Hollman, 500 N.E.2d 297,299 (N.Y. 1986) (recounting that
"[the police had received numerous complaints of nudism from local residents, civic associations, elected
officials and visitors to the beach").
227 Ritter, supra note 174, at 3A (quoting John Quirk, chief ranger in the San Diego state parks district).
The article added that "[uinder California law, public nudity is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, but it's
not enforced on state-run beaches unless there are complaints, officials say." Id. The article further indicated
that local prosecutors in Wisconsin refused to heed pressure from the California State Department of Natural
Resources to prosecute nude sunbathers who stayed in what was traditionally regarded as the nude part of the
beach. See id. For other examples, see South Fla. FreeBeaches, 734 F.2d at 609 (indicating that statutes and
ordinances prohibiting nude sunbathing in Miami "were not consistently enforced" until recent times); Kevin
Murphy, ChristianGroup Backs Suit Over Nude Beach, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Feb. 14, 2001, at

3B (reporting that a canoe outfitter has brought suit against nude sunbathers because the local district attorney
will not prosecute them).
223 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (providing that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf.., against any person ... who alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent standard or limitation"
imposed by the Clean Water Act or an administrative order regarding such provisions); see generally Barton
H. Thompson, The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192 (observing
that "[elvery major environmental law passed since 1970 now includes a citizen suit provision (with the
anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act"). Citizen suits are also
available for violations of the procedural requirements of environmental statutes, while they are not available
for violations of certain substantive provisions. See id. at 193. Note, too, that all citizen suit plaintiffs must
atisfy judicial standing requirements. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). For a
general overview of the mechanics of environmental citizen suits, see JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS:
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987).

221, See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (describing the penalties available in citizen suits under the Clean Water
Act).
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limited resources. 230 They encourage individuals to identify both harms and
legal violations that have gone unnoticed by governmental authorities. 2231 They
serve to motivate governmental officials to address violations that have been
ignored. 232 They further democratic values by giving private individuals a role
in the enforcement of the laws.233 And they enable private individuals to seek
an end to illegal conduct themselves, rather than limiting individuals to efforts
to persuade the government to take action.234 The pursuit of these goals has
become so important that Professor Barton Thompson recently described "the
involvement of citizens in the enforcement of environmental laws" as
"[p]erhaps the most pervasive, prominent, and continuing innovation in the
modem environmental era. ' 235 Moral nuisances function in the same manner,
especially by providing a private means of enforcing laws that governmental
authorities are unwilling to address.
Of course, citizen suits are controversial. Perfect enforcement of the law is
not always desirable, especially if it is achieved by intrusive enforcement
230 See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D.
Mass. 1993) (noting that the sponsors of the Clean Air Act supported citizen suits because of "the inevitable
lack of resources for [federal environmental] agencies to address all statutory violations"); Frank B. Cross,
Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENvrL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 56 (1989) (stating that "[flederal
agencies may lack the manpower and financial resources to pursue all the enforcement cases that they might
desire"); Thompson, supra note 228, at 191 (describing "the enforcement wings of both federal and state
environmental agencies" as "often woefully understaffed and underfunded").
231 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(quoting the legislative history of the Clean Air Act indicating that "[citizens can be a useful instrument for
detecting violations and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike");
Thompson, supra note 228, at 209-10 (observing that "[g]ovemment officials often may have only a very
incomplete understanding of the harm, both physical and psychological, to local communities from
environmental violations").
232 See ConservationLmv Found. of New England,840 F. Supp. at 174 ("Sponsors of the Clean Air Act
were wary of the untrustworthiness or lack of will of federal environmental agencies."); see also Barry Boyer
& Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen Suits Under
FederalEnvironmental Laws, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 833, 844-45 (1985) (quoting Ralph Nader's complaint in 1970
that air polluters "are openly flouting the laws, and an Administration allegedly dedicated to law and order sits
on its duties") (quoting Ralph Nader, Introductionto J. EsPosrro, VANIsiING AIR vii (1970)).
233 See Thompson, supranote 228, at 188 (describing "the promotion of democratic values" as "[p]ossibly
the greatest benefit of citizen participation in enforcement activities" because "[s]imply opening enforcement
channels to citizens gives them a voice that is crucial to the stature and power of private citizens in a
democratic society").
234 See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
82-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming an injunction against Clean water Act permit violations by a tank farm).
235 Thompson, supra note 228, at 185. Note that the analogy between moral nuisance cases brought by
concerned neighbors and environmental citizen suits is not exact. Citizen suits are different to the extent that,
in many instances, they make "no attempt to define or remedy private wrongs." Boyer & Meidinger, supra
note 232, at 836. They cannot be used to compensate injured parties for their damages, and they provide
"reasonable" attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs. See Thompson, supranote 228, at 193-94.
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measures. As Professor Thompson observes, "one need only imagine the
consternation if the government actively encouraged citizens to enforce the
laws against highway speeding by rewarding informants, supporting citizen
highway patrols, and permitting private citizens to prosecute alleged
But moral nuisance actions contain checks against these
speeders.
concerns about citizen suits. The nature of the harm is decisive here. The
legal prohibitions against nude beaches, houses of prostitution, and other
public sexual activities rest on a generalized concern about the need to protect
the public morals. Efforts by governmental authorities to enforce such legal
prohibitions face understandable complaints about intrusive investigative
techniques and prosecutorial overzealousness. By contrast, a general concern
about the moral standing of the community fails to support a nuisance actionprivate or public-brought by a private individual or community group. To
illustrate: when the leader of the Leadville, Colorado Women's Christian
Temperance Union sued to object to the forty local saloons because of the
impact that they were having on the morality of men in the community, the
court dismissed the case, finding that she did not suffer the kind of injury
necessary for a private individual to bring a public nuisance suit.237 Similarly,
moral nuisance actions will not encourage intrusive private snooping into
immoral activities on a neighbor's property because activities that are hidden
from view are by definition insufficient to produce the kind of harm necessary
for a private nuisance suit.
The availability of judicial remedies for moral nuisances also serves as an
alternative to extralegal self-help remedies by concerned neighbors. As Wood
explained in the context of houses of prostitution over a century ago:
No nuisance whose effect is merely moral can be abated except by
the courts, and by the courts only, by the administration of such
punishment as will be likely to cause the parties to desist. It is very
laudable on the part of the people . . . and the indignation ex-

perienced by them at the presence of such institutions in their midst
is just; but they will not be justified in attempting to check the evil by
any riotous or unlawful means. The courts are always ready to
punish the offense, and individuals will not be justified either in
tearing down, assaulting or in any manner injuring the house or
demolishing the fumiture or assaulting the inmates thereof, or doing
any other unlawful acts.2M
2-36 Thompson, supranote 228, at 188.
2-7 People ex reL L'Abbe v. District Court of Lake County, 58 P. 604,604 (Colo. 1899).
2-'4 1 WOOD, supra note 5, at 53-54.
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Arguments based on the failure of the government to respond to private
pressures are always tricky, but in this instance the concern continues to
resonate for neighbors confronted with moral nuisances.239
One caution remains regarding the legality of the defendant's activity. The
government's failure to enforce a prohibition against an activity like public
nudity may be the result of a calculated decision, rather than a lack of
enforcement resources. Perfect enforcement of such laws may raise the same
A tacit comconcerns as perfect enforcement of environmental laws.
promise, in other words, may exist between the illegality of an activity and
official tolerance of it. On that account, the prospect of moral nuisance suits
brought by private parties would disrupt that balance. That concern should not
itself present a barrier to nuisance claims brought by private parties, but it
should influence the disposition of such claims. For example, the failure to
engage in government enforcement may signal the kind of community
acceptance of an activity that is relevant to the balancing test for the
determination of the remedy for a nuisance. Or private actions may provoke
an effort to lift the legal prohibition against the activity. But nuisance actions
should be available to test the correctness of either assumption, just as
environmental laws specifically permit citizen suits to be brought even if the
government has made a purposeful decision not to enforce the law in a
particular instance.
B. The Appropriatenessof the Defendant'sActivity
Nuisance law considers the propriety of the defendant's activity as well as
the nature of the plaintiffs harm. As the appeals court explained in Mark,
"Whether a particular activity is a nuisance is primarily a factual question that
requires applying well-established criteria." 24 1 As noted above, the Restatement test that is commonly applied to determine whether an activity constitutes
a nuisance requires a balancing of the harms caused by the defendant's activity
with the benefits of that activity. 242 Three factors in particular are likely to be
decisive in moral nuisance cases like Mark: the value of the defendant's

239 See, e.g., Dawn Turner Trice, For Neighbors, Lot Is a Load of Trouble, CHi.TRIB., Oct. 25, 2000,

MetroChicago at 1.
240 See Thompson, supra note 228, at 190 (explaining that "a perfect compliance rate, of course, is
unrealistic and undesirable").
241 Mark v. Oregon State Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716, 720 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist., 965 P.2d 433 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)).
242 See supratext accompanying note 61.
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activity, the location of the defendant's activity, and (as already discussed
above) the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The court in Mark did not have the
243
but the circumstances of that case
occasion to evaluate those factors,
illustrate the issues that are likely to arise in other moral nuisance cases.
1. The Value of the Defendant'sActivity
The societal importance of the activity challenged as a nuisance often
determines the validity of a nuisance claim. That is why fireworks are more
likely to be deemed nuisances than hospitals. Cemeteries offer another
example. The courts have refused to treat cemeteries as nuisances anywhere
outside residential areas because of the need to locate cemeteries some44
A similar theme is evidenced in the increased acceptance of group
where.
homes for the disabled despite the opposition of neighbors. 45
Assertions of social utility are lacking in most moral nuisance cases. There
is no record of cases defending the value of house of prostitution, gambling
parlors, or saloons in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. But
nude beaches like the one at issue in Mark enjoy more champions. According
to their proponents, nude beaches provide a variety of benefits to physical
health, emotional satisfaction, and spirituality. 24 The courts have noted these
claims, but there is no indication that the courts have been persuaded by them.
The consensus in most communities appears to be that these purported benefits
are not valued as highly as residential home ownership and other activities
whose importance often outweighs nuisance claims against them.

241 974 P.2d at 718-19, 725 (reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive

relief for failure to state a claim, and remanding for further proceedings).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 144, 158.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
246 See generally Kellam & Lovelace, supra note 205, at 589-90 (recounting the purported benefits of
social nudism). For the assertions of similar benefits by those objecting to laws prohibiting nude beaches, see
South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs
claimed that nude sunbathing was "the practice by which they advocate[d] and communicate[d] their
philosophy that the human body is wholesome and that nudity is not indecent'); Pendergrass v. State, 193 So.
2d 126. 128 (Miss. 1966) (reporting testimony that "sunlight and fresh air purify the body and are healthful,
not only physically but mentally"); People v. Hollman, 500 N.E.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. 1986) (describing "the
Naturist philosophy that open social nudity promotes health, that it permits heightened awareness of human
similarity and vulnerability and that it presents an alternative to the repression of puritanism and the
degradation of pornography"). But see United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 113 (4th Cir. 1991) (reporting
that the only reason that the defendant gave for going topless was "[t]o get some extra sun").
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2. The Place of the Defendant'sActivity
Nuisance law places great weight on location. In Justice Sutherland's
famous words, a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 247 The old moral nuisance cases
belied this principle because they involved activities that were treated as
nuisances per se-nuisances regardless of where they occurred. More
recently, though, zoning law suggests that location is also important for
allegedly immoral uses. Adult bookstores, bars, and similar venues are often
restricted to a specified distance from schools, churches, and other sensitive
uses. 248
Alternatively, such activities are simply relegated to a certain part of
town. 249
Mark raises the question of the propriety of using a public wildlife area as a
nude beach. That particular dispute could be resolved easily if the statutory
definition of the wildlife area precluded such recreation activities because they
were unrelated to wildlife. Indeed, the court hinted at that issue when it
described "open public nudity" as "not wildlife-oriented recreation. ' ' 50 Many
other nude beach cases have turned on the specific characteristics of the
location where the dispute occurred. Putting all other criteria aside, public
nudity is less troublesome in more remote places and in locations that are
screened from the public view 1 Conversely, the cases sustaining the
prosecutions of nude sunbathers have often arisen in areas where the public
was or could be present.252

247 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
248 See, e.g., 65 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/11-5-1.5 (,Vest 1999) ("[I]t is prohibited within a municipality to
locate an adult entertainment facility within 1,000 feet of the property boundaries of any school, day care
center, cemetery, public park, forest preserve, public housing, and place of religious worship.").
249 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a municipal ordinance
that concentrated the location of adult theaters within the city).
250 Mark v. Oregon State Dep't of Fish and wildlife, 974 P.2d 716, 718 (Or. CL App. 1999).
25' See In re Smith, 497 P.2d 807, 810 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the act of sunbathing in the nude on an
isolated beach, without intent to engage in sexual activity, does not qualify as indecent exposure); Collins v.
State, 288 S.E.2d 43, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) ("There is a distinction with a difference in nude sunbathing on
an isolated beach when compared to one's backyard basking in the sun."); State v. Kalama, 8 P.3d 1224, 1225
(Haw. 2000) (overturning an indecent exposure conviction for nude sunbathing in an "isolated and desolate"
area); see also Ritter, supra note 174, at 3A (reporting that "nudity on public beaches usually occurs off the
beaten path").
252 See People v. Hollman, 500 N.E.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. 1986) (affirming a conviction at a beach where
there had been "numerous complaints of nudism from local residents, civic associations, elected officials and
visitors to the beach").
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The balance may also be affected by who was there first. The coming-tothe-nuisance cases often impose a higher burden on a plaintiff who objects to
activities that the defendant conducted on the site well before the plaintiff
arrived. Yet, as noted above, the coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine is not
temporal
always favored, and the most common approach today is to treat
3
priority as one of many factors to be considered in the balancing2
The coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine is even less persuasive in many moral
nuisance cases. The fact that your neighbor had been renting his house to
prostitutes long before you arrived in the neighborhood is unlikely to be
relevant in an ensuing nuisance case. Perhaps this is true of all activities that
have been treated as nuisances per se, or even of all illegal activities. Such a
claim was raised, though, in Mark. The state argued that the wildlife area had
been used as a nude beach since the 1970s, well before Mark and Powers
bought their adjacent house. The trial court, however, concluded that Mark
and Powers "were unaware that they were purchasing property next to a nude
beach. ' ' 2 4 Additionally, there are a few other cases in which the court referred
to the longevity of a nude beach. 55 If this should become a factor in future
moral nuisance claims, it should be outweighed by a statute rendering the
conduct illegal or by significant showings with respect to the other factors to
be balanced.
IV. THE APPLICATION

OF A THEORY OF MORAL

NUISANCES

Mark is an unusual case. So unusual, it might be said, that any theory
constructed from it is hopelessly narrow. Actually, a variety of possible moral
nuisance actions come to mind. I will briefly describe three possibilities here:
neighborhood opposition to illegal activities in low income urban areas,
challenges to hunting and other alleged violations of animal rights, and
concerns about non-traditional houses of worship.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
254 Letter from Judge Grove, supra note 18, at 2. The state argued that Mark and Powers should have
known that the land adjacent to their property had been used as a nude beach since the 1970s. Respondent's
Brief at 16-17, Mark v. Oregon State Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. CL App. 1999) (No. CAA97066); see also Bob Scheer, In Defense of Nude Bathers, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 13, 2001, at B6 (letter to
the editor inisisting that if Mark and Powers "had driven 500 feet past their home they would have seen the
first
of many signs saying, 'Clothing Optional"').
255 See United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 114 n.1(4th Cir. 1991) (indicating that a ban on nudity on
the beach of a wildlife refuge had been instituted seven years before in response to growing complaints);
Hollnian,500 N.E.2d at 299 (noting that a beach had become known over the years as "clothing optional").
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A. Drug Dealing,Prostitution,and Other UrbanBlights
A moral nuisance claim empowers residents of low income communities
that face a staggering array of social problems. To begin with, concerns about
the use of property for prostitution are not a relic of the nineteenth century.
Residents of one Chicago neighborhood recently worked to prevent prostitutes
from congregating in their community. 6 Their tactics are instructive. First,
the neighbors contacted the local police and encouraged the government to
take action, which it did. This fits with my preference for public action as the
first choice in moral nuisance cases. But when that failed to solve the problem
completely, some neighbors actually chased the prostitutes-and their
customers-away from the neighborhood themselves. Such self help actions
are precisely the reason why nuisance actions hold promise in this context.
Nuisance law provides frustrated residents with a legal tool to prevent
activities that
they find morally objectionable from occurring in their
2 57
community.

Nuisance suits brought by concerned residents have already been used to
combat illegal drug activities in low income neighborhoods. In the words of
one commentator, "illegal drugs destroy communities."58 In particular, the
activities associated with illegal drugs threaten the physical safety and health
of local residents-especially children-as dealers and their customers conduct
their illicit business and take violent measures to defend their turf. Again,
governmental enforcement of criminal laws is the first option in such cases,
and rightfully so. But many communities remain virtually unhabitable despite
the government's war on drugs. In response, residents of several communities
have brought nuisance actions against the owners of property used to facilitate

256 See Trice, supranote 239, at 1. For other recent instances of residents opposing prostitution in their
neigborhoods, see Melissa Moore, Residents Target Prostitutionin Neighborhood,BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE,
July 11, 2000, at 2B (describing efforts to eliminate prostitution from a dangerous city neighborhood); Franci
Richardson, Roxbury Neighbors Rally Against Prostitutes,BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 28, 2000, at 3 (quoting a
Massachusetts community organizer who rallied "to send a message to prostitutes that we won't tolerate
prostitution in this area"); John Richardson, Police Target South PortlandBusiness;A Woman Is Arrested on a
Charge of Prostitution at a Main Street "Modeling Club" That Has Generated Many Complaints from
Neighbors, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 30,2000, at IB (quoting a police official who noted that "[wle've
had complaints from residents for a long, long time" about a house of prostitution).
257 Note that nuisance law succeeds in this context only if there is an adequate connection between the
defendant and the prostitution. See City of St. Louis v. Varahi, Inc., No. ED77802, 2001 WL 204796 (Mo.
App. Feb. 28, 2001) (opinion not released for publication pending possible rehearing, transfer, or modification)
(reversing a determination that a hotel constituted a public nuisance because there was insufficient evidence
that the hotel was the proximate cause of prostitution in the neighborhood).
258 Saleem, supra note 10, at 709.
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illegal drug transactions. 259 The kinds of harms suffered by those living near
illegal drug activities-including fear for one's personal safety, outrage at the
sight of conduct that is illegal, and unwillingness to invite friends to visit
because of the presence of such conduct-are all cognizable in moral nuisance
cases.
Finally, nuisance law may provide a remedy for residents who are offended
by the dilapidated condition of nearby property. Complaints about broken
windows, junked cars, and other eyesores feature prominently in many
descriptions of neglected communities. And such concerns have motivated a
number of prominent governmental efforts to improve the condition of certain
neighborhoods. 26 Nuisance law provides an additional tool for residents who
seek to rid their neighborhoods of such unsightly conditions. The success of
any such nuisance claim will mimic
the uncertain willingness of the courts to
26
accept aesthetic nuisance claims. '
B. Animal Rights and Hunting
The animal rights movement regards many activities that harm animals as
immoral. These moral objections have given rise to statutes in every state that
prohibit cruelty to animals. 262 There are also numerous other statutory
prohibitions against staging fights between animals, abusive animal research,

259 See Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 43-44 (Ct. App. 1993) (sustaining a nuisance action
against an apartment complex where residents feared for their safety due to the drug dealing and prostitution
occurring on the premises); Martinez v. Pacific Bell, 275 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting a
public nuisance complaint brought by a parking lot employee who objected to the presence of a public
telephone that was used in illegal drug transactions); Doe v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 630 N.E.2d 248,250,
257 WMass. 1994) (rejecting a nuisance claim based on the noise, litter, and crime associated with drug dealing
on the grounds that an apartment tenant cannot sue her ownlandlord for nuisance); see also Saleem, supranote
10, at 713-14 (describing the use of smal claims courts to file nuisance action). There are also statutes that
specifically permit such actions; see also, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SA=FrY CODE § 11,570 (vest 1991)
(authorizing both private and public nuisance actions against property used for the sale of illegal drugs);
Suzanne G. Lieberman, Note, Drug Dealing and Street Gangs-The New Nuisances: Modernizing Old
Theories and BringingNeighbors Together in the War Against Crime, 50 WASH. U. J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L.
235, 264 (1996) (advocating an administrative system that "would empower the neighboring residents to fight
crime in their communities").
260 See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighbors, 48 DuKE L.J. 75 (1998) (proposing
"block improvement districts" to respond to urban quality of life concerns); Philip B. Heymann, The New
Policing, 28 FORDHA, URB. LJ. 407 (2000) (describing community policing efforts in Boston, Chicago, and
New York City).
261 See supratext accompanying notes 124-36.
262 See PAxmELA D. FRAscH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW 601 (2000) (reporting that "[elvery state has an animal

anti-cruelty statute').
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and other activities that injure animals. 263 All of these statutes are enforced by
governmental authorities. Proposals to facilitate private
enforcement through
264
citizen suits or nuisance law have yet to materialize.
There are no reported nuisance cases in which the plaintiff's injury
involved a moral objection to harm to animals. Such a case, though, would fall
neatly within my theory. Imagine if the sight that Teri Powers and Glen Mark
observed in the adjacent wildlife area was the torture of animals living there.
The repulsion and embarrassment that they would feel could mirror their
reaction to the presence of the nude beach. They could be unwilling to invite
friends to their home because of the sights and sounds of the activities on the
neighboring land. Their moral sensibilities, moreover, would likely be shared
by most people in their community. Furthermore, the torture of animals is
illegal. In such an instance, if the governmental authorities were unable or
unwilling to act, the private plaintiffs could turn to a moral nuisance action.
Or consider a more controversial example. Suppose that Powers and Mark
objected to hunting. And suppose that they had to witness hunters stalking and
killing animals just across their property line. Hunting could easily be
regarded as a nuisance in suburban areas or any other place where there is a
real threat of stray gunshots. It is also illegal there. Whether or not hunting
could ever be deemed a nuisance in the countryside is more controversial. The
first aspect of that question concerns the nature of the harm suffered by those
neighbors opposed to the hunting. Their moral objection should suffice,
provided that it is premised on actually witnessing or even hearing the activity,
rather than simply being aware that it is occurring. The disputed part of that
question involves the prevalence of such a moral objection in the particular
community in which it occurs. Moral opposition to hunting likely will be
regarded as the idiosyncratic view of hypersensitive plaintiffs in most rural
communities. A nuisance action would be appropriate only where the
community norms indicate that a reasonable person views hunting as immoral.
It is doubtful whether today there is any such rural community that regards all
263 See generally Carole Lynn Nowicki, Note, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 SETON

HALL LEGIS. J. 443 (1999) (summarizing state and federal statutes addressing various kinds of cruelty to
animals).
264 See Joshua E. Gardner, Note, At the Intersection of Constitutional Standing, Congressional
Citizen-Suits, and the Humane Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen the Animal Welfare Act, 68

GEo. WASH. L. REV. 330, 354-57 (2000) (noting proposals to add a citizen suit provision to the federal Animal
welfare Act); Karen L. McDonald, Comment, Creating a Private Cause ofAction Against Abusive Animal

Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 412-32 (1986) (advocating a public nuisance action that could be brought
by animal welfare groups).
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hunting as immoral. It is more likely, though, that a particular form of
hunting-perhaps the use of steel traps-would be viewed as immoral by the
community.
Even then, the harm suffered by any plaintiffs would need to be weighed
against the values of the particular kind of hunting. Also, any existing statutes
and ordinances governing the land in question and hunting in that jurisdiction
could prove decisive. If hunting is expressly permitted in an area, then a
nuisance claim should fail. But if hunting is expressly prohibited, and the local
authorities have not enforced that legal ban, then a nuisance action is entirely
appropriate.
C. Houses of Worship and Other Religious Uses
Finally, it is useful to illustrate what would not qualify as a moral nuisance
under my theory. Civil rights legislation prohibits many harmful actions based
on a neighbor's race, ethnicity, or religious beliefs.265 Nuisance law refused to
treat such biases as cognizable harms even before civil rights statutes
existed. 266 Yet explicit complaints against a neighbor's race, ethnicity, or
religion are rare. Moreover, there are numerous non-biased reasons articulated
for objections to the presence of certain people and uses. For instance, while
courts have rejected the assertion that mere presence of low income residents
constituted "people pollution" requiring an environmental impact statement
("EIS") before a particular housing project could be built, complaints about
increased traffic and other environmental consequences
of such a project did
267
suffice to require the preparation of an EIS.

265 See, e.g., Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (suggesting that a woman would
have violated the federal Fair Housing Act if she had tried to drive a neighbor away because of the neighbor's
nationality, but concluding that there was no evidence that the woman intended to do so in this case); Riedel v.
Human Rels. Comm'n of Reading, 756 A.2d 142 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a man who made repeated obscene,
hostile, and derogatory remarks to a Puerto Rican neighbor and her children violated a local human relations
ordinance because the ordinance applied to all discriminatory conduct designed to interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of one's residence, not just conduct involving the sale or rental of housing).
266 See Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292 (1883) (refusing to enjoin defendant from renting a house to a
family of another race, despite his neighbor's objection).
267 See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d
1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 465 F.
Supp. 850, 857 n.2 (D. Minn. 1978).
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The same phenomenon is evident in the complaints that neighbors bring
26
8
against churches, other houses of worship, and related religious uses.
Increased traffic is a common complaint. Aesthetic concerns are often voiced.
And church bells annoy some neighbors. But sometimes opposition to a
nearby house of worship is really based on religious prejudice.
Zoning law
struggles with churches precisely because of the intersection of such concerns,
plus the recognized social value of religious activities.
For example, plans to convert a Reformed church into a Muslim mosque
sparked a recent controversy in Palos Heights, Illinois. 27 Some residents
questioned the noise from calls to prayer. 271 The mosque also drew protests
regarding traffic.27 2 The fact that the facility would be busiest on Friday rather
than Sunday concerned some neighbors. 3 And some members of the
community also explicitly objected to the proposed mosque because of its
religious teachings. 274

My moral nuisance theory would permit an action based on the traffic and
noise complaints, but so would existing applications of nuisance law. The
268 See, e.g., First Baptist Church v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So.2d 1114 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (indicating
that neighboring residents opposed the expansion of a church school "based on the potential for increased
traffic and crime in the neighborhood"); Village Lutheran Church v. City of LaDue, 997 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting that neighbors objected to a new church gymnasium because it "would have a negative
impact on the view from their houses"); SHIM v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 689 A.2d 804 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1997) (recounting traffic concerns raised by neighbors opposing a proposed church expansion); Douglas
Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 755, 759-63 (1999) (suggesting that
neighbors object to churches because of lost property tax revenue and general opposition to any development).
269 See Laycock, supra note 268, at 760 (explaining that some opposition to neighboring churches exists
because "[s]ome are hostile to all religion," and "[pleople who are religious themselves are often hostile to
unfamiliar faiths, to high intensity faiths, and to conservative and evangelical churches").
270 See Darlene Gavron Stevens, Mosque a Religious, PoliticalTug of War, CHI. TRi., July 27,2000, at
1.
271 See id. at Back Page.
272 See id.
273 See id.

274 See The High Priceof ClosedMinds, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2000, at 10 (noting that one opponent of the
mosque described Islam as a "false religion" during a television interview). For reports of similar controversies, see Ice Skating Arena Closes; Synagogue to Buy Site, L.A. TWiES, Sept. 1, 2000, at B2 (reporting
that objections to the conversion of the Irvine Ice Arena into a synagogue have led to accusations of antiSemitism); Margaret Ramirez, Removing Obstacles to Religious Buildings, L.A. Timls, Aug. 5, 2000, at B2
(indicating that the building of a mosque was approved in Culer City, California despite complaints about
traffic, the Islamic architecture, and glare from the building's marble); see generally 146 CONG. REC. S7774
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) (stating that congressional hearings demonstrated that "[c]hurches in
general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face
of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation").

20011

MORAL NUISANCES

complaints specifically objecting to the mosque because of the nature of the
religion practiced there would not support a moral nuisance claim under my
theory. Opposition to the beliefs of a neighbor does not serve as a cognizable
harm for purposes of a nuisance action. Moreover, the existence of both
constitutional and statutory protections could serve to bar any nuisance claim
against the mosque, regardless of the alleged injury. A finding that the sensory
objections-to excessive noise and traffic-were pretextual would operate to
block a nuisance claim under federal civil rights laws. The most recent such
law specifically protects religious uses from land use decisions, including
nuisance actions, that seek to deny one's ability to engage in religious activities
on his or her property.275
V. CONCLUSION

Nuisance law protects against activities that interfere with the use and
enjoyment of one's own land. The law has long protected against many
different interferences that result in many different harms. The moral concerns
that were featured in the nineteenth century cases involving houses of
prostitution, saloons, and the like are shared by many today. Accordingly,
nuisance law should treat the harms caused by those activities in the same way
that it treats other harms. In other words, harms involving offensive sights, the
inability to use one's property because of embarrassment associated with a
neighboring activity, reasonable fears, and more general concerns about noises
or harassment are all sufficient to support a nuisance action.
Zoning ordinances and other regulations can combat such activities. Those
approaches are preferable in many respects. But those solutions are not always
perfect, and they depend on the interest, energy, and resources of governmental
officials. When governmental solutions are not forthcoming, nuisance law
provides a vehicle for private individuals to address what troubles them in their
communities. Just as the government permits private enforcement of environmental laws, so too should it permit private individuals to bring nuisance
actions to enjoin activities that offend not only their moral sensibilities, but
also those of the community in which they live.

275 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803,
§ 2 (2000) (imposing a compelling state interest test on land use regulations that impose a substantial burden
on the exercise of religion).
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Perhaps most importantly, moral nuisance law protects. It is just like other
applications of nuisance law that protect against environmental contamination,
loud noises, and offensive smells. By contrast, the aim of moral nuisance
claims is not to convert the defendant to the moral beliefs of the plaintiff. This
distinction is best illustrated by Justice David Brewer, who rejected the most
invidious nuisance claim ever reported, 276 but who is best known today for
277
writing the Supreme Court opinion stating that "this is a Christian nation."
In 1899-the same year in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that a house
of prostitution constituted a nuisance in a case later cited in Mark2-Brewer
lamented that "[m]aking men good by law has become a fad., 2 79 He added,
"Closing the saloon does not destroy the appetite for drink. Driving out the
brothel does not destroy lust. Shutting up the gambling house does not
eliminate the eager passion for gaming."2 80 In other words, the nineteenth
century moral nuisance cases were not designed to impose a better morality, as
the experience with Prohibition confirmed a few decades letter. Rather,
Brewer explained, "the function of the law is simply to protect., 281 It still is
today.

276 See Faloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292,297 (1883) (holding that the mere presence of Afican-American
neighbors did not constitute a nuisance).
277 Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). The "Christian nation" remark has
elicited much recent reaction.

See MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD & DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME

COURT JUSTICE 1837-1910, at 110-11 (1994) (discussing Holy Trinity); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 523
(2d ed. 1995) (asking "what about the 'Christian nation' stuff" in Holy Trinity); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the
Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation,100 COLUm. L REV. 901,
903-04 n.13 (2000) (describing subsequent judicial and academic treatment of the "Christian nation"
assertion); Steven K. Green, JusticeDavidJosiahBreiverand the "ChristianNation" Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV.
427,430 (1999) (concluding that "Brewer would have disagreed with most uses of his declaration, specifically
with regard to claims that the law is obliged to support or advance Christian principles"). Justice Brewer
himself later demonstrated that he intended the appellation to be descriptive of the United States at that time,
while offering several general normative calls for racial harmony and world peace. See generally DAVID J.
BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION (John C. Winston Co., 1905).
278 See Blagen v. Smith, 56 P. 292 (Or. 1899).
279 DAVID J. BREWER, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FROM ANOTHER VIEWPoINT 50 (1899).
210 Id. at 52.
211 Id. at 51.

